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ABSTRACT
Essays in Public Economics
by
Enda Patrick Hargaden
Chair: James R. Hines, Jr.
This dissertation comprises three research papers, each of which addresses a question
in public economics.
Chapter 1 investigates the response of taxpayers to tax incentives in Ireland be-
fore and after the Great Recession. Pre-2009 there is clear evidence of bunching in
the income distribution just below thresholds that trigger large tax liabilities. This
evidence disappears from 2009 onwards. This suggests that the taxpayer response is
weaker during a recession. Much of the difference reflects reduced employment in sec-
tors such as construction that exhibit above-average ability to report tax-advantaged
incomes. However, even for people who remained with the same firm over the period
the likelihood of reporting a tax-advantaged income fell during the recession.
Chapter 2 examines the link between political fragmentation and tax policy. A
model of government is presented where an n-member coalition chooses revenue
x
and expenditure policies. I derive the response of tax policy to a change in the
number of coalition partners. The model predicts that more fragmentation leads to
(i) lower taxes; (ii) lower expenditure; and (iii) lower social security transfers. These
results run counter to the conventional wisdom that countries with more fragmented
governments have larger public sectors. I test the model on a large panel of developed
countries, and all three of the model’s predictions are supported. I estimate that
moving from a two- to three-party legislature lowers tax revenue by 6.7%, expenditure
by 9.5%, and transfers by 5.4%.
Chapter 3 tests the relationship between crime and the labour market in Ireland
during the boom and bust period 2003–2014. Based on detailed county-level panel
data on crime and unemployment register figures, higher unemployment is associated
with higher crime rates: I estimate a property crime elasticity of about 0.5. This
implies that a 10% rise in numbers on the unemployment register increases thefts
and burglaries by 5%. To estimate causal effects, I also test the relationship using
a Bartik-style instrumental variable. The IV results confirm that a reduction in
employment leads to more crime.
xi
CHAPTER I
Taxpayer Responses over the Cycle: Evidence
from Irish Notches
1.1 Introduction
This paper investigates whether employees respond to tax incentives differently
during recessions, exploiting a series of natural experiments to identify the response
of taxpayers’ incomes to changes in tax rates over the business cycle in Ireland,
2005–2013. I find that employees are less responsive during recessions. The paper
analyzes the distribution of taxable income in the neighborhood of ‘notches’, which
are thresholds in the income schedule after which after-tax incomes discontinuously
drop. Notches provide extremely strong incentives to manipulate reported income.
For example, by earning e1 over e26,000 in 2010 an individual’s tax liability in-
creased by e1,040. Such unambiguous incentives provide a clean test of people’s
ability to adjust taxable income. The Irish tax system included notches before, dur-
ing, and in the immediate aftermath of the Great Recession. During the time period,
two new notches were introduced, two old notches were abolished, and the location
of the thresholds changed on an almost-annual basis.
There is clear evidence of income manipulation to just below the notches, with
1
excess mass (“bunching”) in the earnings distribution at levels that avoid the tax
liability. The characteristics of both the employer and the employee are determinants
of reporting a tax-advantageous income. For example, people who work for sole
proprietors and people who work in the construction sector are more likely to report
tax-advantaged incomes, whereas workers in public administration are the least likely
to report incomes that avoid the tax liability.
However, the evidence of income manipulation is muted beginning in 2009, and
bunching about notches is not statistically significant thereafter. Interpreting the
introduction of a notch as a treatment affecting the number of people avoiding an
income threshold, the treatment effects from before 2008 are approximately three
times as large as those after 2008. Unemployment rose from 4.9% in January 2008 to
13% by October 2009. There is little-to-no evidence of behavioral adjustment after
the economic environment deteriorated: the labor force’s response to tax incentives
during recessions appears muted.
The data source and identifying variation in this paper provide several advantages
over other recent papers in the literature on taxpayer responses. Firstly, the data
are administrative records provided by the Irish Revenue Commissioners.1 Employee
tax returns in Ireland are filed to the tax authorities directly by their employer, and
employees generally make no additional deductions to their taxable income. As wages
are tax-deductible for firms and filing incorrect returns is a serious criminal offence,
it is unlikely that the results are driven solely by misreporting. Secondly, notches
induce sharp changes in the total tax liability of workers (Slemrod, 2013). Unlike
estimates based on changes in the marginal rate (Saez, 2010; Bastani and Selin,
2014), estimates come from thresholds where net income falls discontinuously. As the
1The data come from a tax agency in a developed country responsible for the collection of a large
share of national product: income taxes in 2013 amounted to e17.2bn of a total GNP of e158.3bn.
Sources: Department of Finance Databank, CSO Quarterly National Accounts.
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changes in tax liability are on average worth about a week’s wages, these are large and
likely salient magnitudes to workers. Furthermore, the annual budget is announced
the month prior to taking force, thus providing people approximately 13 months to
adjust reported income. Thirdly, the estimation will exploit the fact that the location
of the notches changed almost-annually. I will argue that this additional variation
facilitates a more compelling identification strategy than conventional approaches.
Fourthly, the notches are local to people earning the average industrial wage. Many
previous studies on the effect of tax rates on taxable income (Auten and Carroll,
1999; Feldstein, 1995; Gruber and Saez, 2002) have focused primarily on the effects
on higher earners. Lastly, the time period saw particularly volatile movements in
output. The data contain both the booming Celtic Tiger economy where GNP
growth averaged 5% per annum, and also the Great Recession that immediately
followed. The drop in quarterly output during from peak to trough was four times
larger in Ireland than in the United States.
The paper includes a variety of methods to investigate the behavioral response.
Primarily, the fact that the notch thresholds change facilitates a new difference-
bunching estimator. This tests whether the income distribution about a notch
changes significantly from the prior year. The conditions for parameter identifi-
cation using this method are less restrictive than the level-bunching estimates used
by e.g. Saez (2010), Chetty et al. (2011), and Kleven and Waseem (2013). The
difference-bunching evidence is clear in 2006–2008, but disappears from 2009.
To ensure the results are not caused by shifts in the income distribution, the
paper also includes details on more direct tests for between-years differences in the
distribution with the Kolmogorov-Smirnov testing procedure. This test is particu-
larly useful as it requires no distributional assumptions and holds even under certain
forms of non-stationarity. This method provides more statistical evidence of a muted
3
response from 2009.
Borrowing terminology from the RCT literature, I also take a more parametric
approach and estimate a fixed-effect Poisson regression to test if the ‘treatment’ of
introducing a notch results in an excess number of people reporting tax-advantaged
incomes just below the notch threshold. The incidence rate ratios are three times
larger in 2006–2008 than in 2009–2013. Through placebo tests, this approach can
also confirm that the results are robust to omitting years where notch thresholds do
not change.
With evidence of cyclicality in mind, I analyze the determinants of reporting
tax-advantaged or tax-disadvantaged incomes. The characteristics of both the em-
ployee (e.g. age, nationality, full-time status) and the firm (e.g. industry, size, form
of incorporation) — and thus the employer-employee pairing — are determinants
of reporting behavior. The industries most likely to report tax advantaged incomes
include construction and agriculture, while employees in state-owned utilities and
public administration do not exhibit bunching in tax-advantaged regions.
As the composition of the labor force changed substantially over the period, I
construct counterfactual wage distributions for different years using the method of
DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1996). The counterfactual decomposes the excess
bunching into a component explained by changes in employer-employee covariates
and an unexplained residual component. The counterfactuals confirm that the chang-
ing composition of the labor force alters the wage distribution during a recession,
and that these changes in characteristics can explain approximately 70% of the tem-
poral variation in reporting behavior. However, the large (30%) residual component
shows that composition alone cannot fully explain the cyclical patterns in taxpayer
responsiveness.
Finally, using inverse probability weights to control for changes in the charac-
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teristics of workers, I confirm that the cyclical variation is not driven purely by the
labor force composition effect: the determinants of bunching themselves change over
the cycle. For example, self-employed people are always more likely to report tax-
advantaged incomes; however, I find that the mean marginal effect (probability of
reporting a tax advantaged income) of self-employment income changes from 13% to
24% between 2006 and 2010. Even holding the labor force fixed, there are additional
constraints on behavior during the recession.
As people reduce their labor supply, avail of more deductions, and put more ef-
fort into hiding activities from tax authorities, changes to income tax rates typically
cause changes in the income tax base. One metric that can summarize all margins of
adjustment is the change in taxable income itself. The elasticity of taxable income
(ETI), a measure of how the total tax base responds to a change in the (net of) tax
rate, has risen in prominence to become a statistic of central importance in public
finance. There are several reasons for this. Principally, under plausible conditions
the ETI is a sufficient statistic for the welfare costs of taxation.2 The basic intuition
is that as the ETI captures all margins of adjustment (evasion, avoidance, decreased
effort levels, etc.) it summarizes all costs of taxation. Statistics with such immediate
application to welfare analysis are rare in economics, and thus substantial research
effort has been expended on the ETI. Furthermore, it is of immediate policy rele-
vance as an estimate of the effects of rate changes on government revenue. Finally,
the ETI is a key determinant of the efficient level of redistribution (Slemrod and
Kopczuk, 2002). Given any tax system and social preferences for redistribution, the
less responsive taxpayers are to tax rates (i.e. the lower the ETI) the higher the
optimal amount of redistributive transfers. The ETI is proportional to the extent
of bunching at kinks and notches in the income threshold (Saez, 2010; Kleven and
2See Chetty (2009) and Doerrenberg et al. (2015) for critical discussion on these conditions.
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Waseem, 2013).
This paper adds to the literature on taxpayer responses in three important ways.
Firstly, using the newly developed difference-bunching estimator, I identify the re-
sponse of taxpayers to new notches in the tax code. Secondly, I provide further sup-
port for the existing evidence (Devereux, 2004; Feldman and Slemrod, 2007) that the
characteristics of both the employer and employee are determinants of the response,
e.g. that employees of smaller firms are more likely to report tax-advantageous in-
comes. Finally, I provide clear evidence that the extent of taxpayer response declines
during the recession. I propose that taxpayer responsiveness has a cyclical compo-
nent.3
Cyclicality in the behavioral response of taxpayers carries substantial policy im-
plications. Slemrod and Kopczuk (2002) notes that the ETI depends on both pref-
erences (which are arguably exogenous) and the tax system (which is certainly not
exogenous), and therefore that the value of the ETI can be seen as a policy choice.
If the ETI also varies with the phase of the business cycle, this insight needs to be
generalized. For example, holding tax systems and the concavity of social welfare
function constant, a lower ETI during a recession would suggest less resources need
be directed for optimal enforcement.
1.2 Understanding Taxpayer Responses
A popular graduate public finance textbook (Salanie´, 2011) opens with “Any tax
measure will prompt agents to change their behavior so as to pay less taxes.” The
response of taxpayers to notches in the Irish income tax system, and whether it has a
cyclical component, is the research question of this paper. There are several channels
3A distinct literature has debated whether the fiscal multiplier has a cyclical component, cf.
Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2013, 2012); Bachmann and Sims (2012).
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through which taxpayer responses can change: avoidance, timing, intensity of labor
effort, etc. (Saez, Slemrod and Giertz, 2012).
By far the most common measure of the taxpayer response is the elasticity of
taxable income (ETI), the percent change in taxable income caused by a percent
change in the net of tax rate. Heterogeneous responses are to be expected. Devereux
(2004) finds larger labor supply elasticities for women than for men, and Kydland
(1984) noted that the hours of less-skilled groups fluctuated relatively more than
high-skilled groups over the cycle. Indeed, to the extent that these groups are spread
across the economy, it is likely that ETI varies by sector.
Any further constraints imposed on behavior during recessions (e.g. to choose
hours) may also affect the ability to change taxable income. There is some suggestive
evidence of cyclicality in tax-claiming from the EITC literature: in the data from
Chetty, Friedman and Saez (2013) the (median) degree of bunching at EITC kink
points peaks in 2007, declines in 2008 and recovers slightly in 2009 for both employees
and the self-employed.
In addition to constraints, the composition of the labor force likely affects its
responsiveness to taxation. If business cycles create non-random attrition from the
labor market, and/or the nature of employer-employee pairings changes during a
recession, then the aggregate ETI will vary. Solon, Barsky and Parker (1994) note
that changes in the composition of the labor market over the cycle are crucial for
measuring real wage cyclically. Similarly, if a recession disproportionately affects 25
year-old male construction workers, and if the ETI for 25 year-old male construction
workers does not perfectly match that of the population, then this attrition will
influence estimates of ETI. Indeed, a simple sufficient condition for cyclical ETI is
non-random attrition from the labor force.
The Great Recession in Ireland saw enormous changes in the labor market, in par-
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ticular in terms of job losses. In some sectors the margin of adjustment was primarily
extensive. Exploiting administrative tax records as a data source4, let us use the con-
struction sector as an example. While the median pay for construction workers fell
by 15% between 2006 and 2012, the numbers employed in the sector fell by 67%.
More than half (51%) of the people employed in construction in 2006-2007 were no
longer in the data in 2012. The composition of the labor force evidently changed sub-
stantially. Perhaps more importantly, the composition of employer-employee pairings
changed too. To continue the construction example, of those that remained employed
in Ireland in 2012, a large fraction (42%) no longer worked in construction. These
people, most of whom were Irish (77%) and male (86%), often found work in con-
siderably different settings. While some got work in quite comparable industries like
agriculture/mining (4%) or manufacturing (16%), many found themselves in whole-
sale/retail (16%), admin and support (13%), or health/social work (10%). The flow
of workers both to different jobs and to outside of the labor force was substantial.
The importance of these flows will become apparent in the empirical analysis, when
we find that the employee-employer pairing is a determinant of reporting behavior.
1.2.1 Empirical Estimates of ETI
One of the earliest estimates of ETI was provided by Feldstein (1995), who used
differences in group means to infer an elasticity in excess of 2 for higher-earners.5
This remains a very high estimate, and the diff-in-diff strategies that generated
consensus estimates are typically less than half this size. For example, Auten and
Carroll (1999) estimate a tax elasticity of 0.6 from changes created by the Tax Reform
Act of 1986, Similarly, Gruber and Saez (2002) estimated the elasticity to be about
4The data are outlined in Section 4.1 below.
5It should be noted that Feldstein was researching prior to the broad availability of administrative
data, and that this estimate was based on a sample size of 57 tax returns.
8
0.4, with a value about half that for average earners and approximately 0.6 for
higher earners, and Singleton (2011) found an elasticity of about 0.25. Subsequent
research highlighted the importance of timing as source of variation (Goolsbee, 2000;
Sammartino and Weiner, 1997) in taxpayer responses. Timing concerns are unlikely
to play a role in this paper as taxes are remitted regularly throughout the year.
Many empirical estimates of the ETI, some of which are mentioned, use stimulus
packages as an identification strategy. Stimulus packages are, almost by definition,
conducted during recessions. If the responsiveness of the labor force changes over
the cycle, then it is likely that estimates would differ if conducted at a peak of
a business cycle rather than a trough. Consequently, the profession’s reliance on
stimulus-based identification strategies may have systematically biased estimates of
the ETI downward.
1.2.1.1 Bunching estimates
More recently the influential contribution of Saez (2010) shows that the extent of
bunching at a kink or notch can identify ETI, and that ETI will be proportional to
the extent of the bunching in the distribution of earners at the kink/notch thresh-
old. Due to the relatively clean identification provided by kinks and notches, the
approach has been applied to a large number of settings: for example, in relation to
Medicaid (Yelowitz, 1995), retirement savings (Ramnath, 2013), VATs (Onji, 2009;
Dharmapala, Slemrod and Wilson, 2011), labor market activation programs (Kline
and Tartari, 2015), automobile characteristics (Sallee and Slemrod, 2012), property
taxes (Best and Kleven, 2015; Kopczuk and Munroe, 2015; Slemrod et al., 2015),
and Spanish corporate tax regulations (Almunia and Lopez-Rodriguez, 2014). Most
of the literature has found bunching where theory would predict it, though some-
times the results are of negligible magnitude (Hsieh and Olken, 2014). An emerging
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literature is beginning to address the dynamics of bunching (Marx, 2012; Mortenson
and Whitten, 2015). This paper investigates the null hypothesis that the rate of
bunching is consistent over the business cycle.
The most relevant paper is Kleven and Waseem (2013) who investigate bunch-
ing about a set of notches in Pakistan, and develop a clever method to decompose
bunching into structural elasticities and optimization frictions. However, Kleven and
Waseem were restricted by the fact that the notch thresholds in Pakistan were con-
stant over time. This required the authors to make relatively strong assumptions
about the extent of bunching at the thresholds. The estimation procedure in this
paper exploits the fact the notch thresholds varied, and thus I estimate the ability
of taxpayers to respond to changes in taxes. The findings are, therefore, of imme-
diate relevance to policymakers considering a change in existing policy and/or the
introduction of a new policy.
1.3 Institutional Background
1.3.1 Tax Collection in Ireland
As they are the individuals required to remit employees’ tax payments to the
Office of the Revenue Commissioners (“Revenue”), the administrative burden of in-
come taxation in Ireland is largely borne by employers. Employers must register each
employee with Revenue when they begin working, and employers are also required
to calculate and deduct income tax each time payments are made to an employee.6
Taxpayers may elect to file individually or jointly with a spouse. Via a ‘tax credit
certificate’7 issued by Revenue when the employee is registered, the employer has a
6Revenue exempt firms from this requirement if the employee earns less than e8 per week.
7Tax credits are not easily manipulated. As of 2015 a single individual receives a tax credit of
e1,650, and this is doubled for married couples. The primary sources of additional credits are those
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record of the correct rate of tax to deduct from an employee’s pay/wages. As the
majority of tax administration is conducted between Revenue and employers directly,
few employees make subsequent changes to taxable income. For example, pension
contributions are deducted from gross income before it becomes liable for tax. The
mortgage interest deduction is paid at source, by the mortgage provider, typically in
the form of a reduced monthly payment.8 Any remaining changes to taxable income
will be a source of measurement error in my data. At the end of the year, employers
are required to file a P35L form to Revenue detailing the total taxable income and
amount of taxes deducted for each employee.
The principal income tax in Ireland is the Pay As You Earn (PAYE) tax. In
2015 the standard rate of PAYE is 20%, with a higher marginal rate of 40% payable
on income in excess of e33,800.9 Although PAYE is the main source of income tax
revenue, there are additional social security-related taxes such as Pay-Related Social
Insurance (PRSI). The focus on this paper is on three other taxes that produced
notches in take-home pay: the Health Levy, the Income Levy, and the Universal
Social Charge (USC).
1.3.2 Health Levy
Officially but less frequently called the Health “Contribution”, the Health Levy
was instituted by Section 4 of the Health Contributions Act, 1979. An unusual
feature of the Health Levy is that its eligibility threshold created a notch in tax-
home pay. Income below the threshold was exempt from the Levy, but an individual
whose annual earnings exceeded the threshold was liable to pay the Levy on the
available for widows, carers of incapacitated children or relatives, and blind people.
8The cost to the Exchequer of the mortgage interest deduction is approximately e350m (Oireach-
tas Debates, 17 July 2014.)
9The e33,800 limit is for a single person. For a married couple the limit is e42,800.
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entirety of their income. Earmarked for health expenditure, the eligibility threshold
has a long history of change.10 Unfortunately, the data on the behavioral response
to the Health Levy prior to the mid-2000s are not available. From the beginning of
the dataset through mid-2009, passing the Health Levy threshold incurred a liability
of 2% of total income. From May 2009 until the end of 2010, that liability increased
to 4%.
1.3.3 Income Levy
With the deterioration in the public finances caused by the decline in the con-
struction sector and the recapitalization of the banking sector, the Irish government
announced the introduction of the Income Levy in 2009. The Income Levy operated
in much the same way as the Health Levy, but was activated at a lower income level.
With a rate of 2% applicable for two-thirds of the year (1 May–31 December) on
incomes of at least e15,028, this implies a liability of e200. The subsequent year it
was applicable for the full year, implying a liability of just over e300.
1.3.4 Universal Social Charge
The Universal Social Charge (USC) was introduced in 2011 to replace the Health
and Income Levies. The threshold was set at e4,004 in 2011 and increased to e10,036
between 2012 and 2014. In 2015 the threshold was raised to e12,012. A 2% liability
in the relevant income range was constant over the period. For comparability to the
previous Levies I will not include analysis of the e4,004 threshold in the main body
10Announcing changes to the tax system in December 1999, Minister for Finance Charlie Mc-
Creevy T.D. stated “As in previous years, the threshold for the payment of the health levy will




Table 1.1: Summary of Notch Thresholds and Liabilities





2009 26,000 15,028 (867) (200)





All units are denominated in nominal euros. The right-hand column in-
dicates the additional tax liability incurred from exceeding thresholds on
the left. For example, earning e1 in excess of e26,000 in 2008 increased
tax liability by e520. Data for 2014 are due for release before the end
of 2015.
Table 1.1 summarizes the notch thresholds and associated liabilities. Notches are
quite an unusual feature in developed countries’ income tax systems. It is unprece-
dented to have such rich variation in notch thresholds in a developed country. The
focus of the empirical estimation in Section 1.4 will be to compare taxpayer responses
to these changes conditional on the employer-employee pairing.
1.4 Empirical Estimates
1.4.1 Data
The data for this paper come from a variety of administrative sources provided
to the Central Statistics Office (CSO). The primary data source is the annual P35L
11The primary result for the e4,004 threshold is that no excess bunching is observed. This is
consistent with a reduced ability to manipulate income during a recession, but I am less convinced
by this result because the e4,004 threshold is further away from the other thresholds. Analysis is
included in the appendices for completeness.
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file that Revenue provides to the CSO. This file includes the Personal Public Service
Number (PPSN)12 of the employee, the business identifier of the employer, the num-
ber of weeks employed, and the total taxable income of the employee. These data
are complete for 2006–2013. The second data source is the Central Business Register
(CBR), which includes firms’ form of incorporation and NACE sector. The third
data source is the Job Churn statistical product, which contains the total reckonable
pay of the firm, the total number of employees, the number of hires, and the number
of separations. These data are complete for 2006–2013. Although it is a non-random
sample for that year, the Job Churn data also include the 2005 taxable income for
‘job-stayers’, i.e. the 79% of workers who remained with the same employer in 2005
and 2006. The fourth data source is Client Record System (CRS), provided by the
Department of Social Protection, which contains the month and year of birth, sex,
and nationality of all employees. All sources are merged using PPSNs, creating a
panel of all registered employees and employers in the state. A sample of 10% of
employees was provided to me by CSO, where the selection was based on random
digit sampling, e.g. if the last digit in the employee’s PPSN equals 7. It remains a
representative sample of the universe of workers from 2006–2013.
There is a noteworthy limitation of the data, namely a lack of information on the
marital status of individuals. Specifically, the data do not indicate if an individual
is married or, if so, to whom. Consequently, there is a class of people for whom the
notches are not relevant: married joint-filers with both spouses working. Married
individuals with only one working spouse, or married individuals who are filing sep-
arately, are all still affected by the notches. However, married joint-filers with both
spouses working will only superficially appear affected by the notches.
I believe this limitation is relatively minor. The inapplicability of the tax thresh-
12The PPSN is comparable to a Social Security Number.
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old to married joint-filers with two incomes will only tend to bias my results towards
zero. Unlike much of the existing literature, I find significant behavioral responses
at thresholds despite this attenuation bias. Furthermore, I am primarily interested
in comparing responses of taxpayers across the business cycle. The set of people not
affected by the notch are (i) married; (ii) jointly filing; and (iii) earning income from
both spouses. The number of weddings in Ireland declined by about 5% during the
recession13, and the divorce rate in Ireland is about two-thirds lower than the Euro-
pean average.14 The decrease in employment over the period likely dominates either
of the preceding two conditions, and thus the set of people who are not affected by
the tax very likely decreases over time. I find that the behavioral response decreases
over time, despite this change.
Minimal cleaning of the data was needed. I removed people earning precisely the
amount provided by Community Employment Schemes15, the Carer’s Allowance16,
or the spousal earning thresholds.17 The Community Employment Schemes and
Carer’s Allowance support thousands of people, creating additional spikes near the
notch points. These are government-sponsored non-market programs with binding
floors, and so I exclude them to avoid contamination with more traditional forms of
income. Similarly, the data always show spikes at the spousal earning thresholds.
The notches are not binding on joint-filing dual income spouses. I remove these
13Source: CSO Marriages Registered by Age Group, Bride and Groom, Form of Ceremony and
Year, Table VSA51
14Source: Eurostat Crude divorce rate, Table tps00013
15The Community Employment (CE) schemes have been in effect since the mid-1990s. They
are subsidized forms of employment for the long-term unemployed. Approximately 22,000 people
were employed in CE Schemes (Oireachtas Debates, 8 February 2012). In 2015, the minimum (and
standard) rate of pay was e208 per week.
16The Department of Social Protection provides a payment to people who care for others (typically
other family members) who for medical reasons require full-time assistance. Approximately 57,000
people are in receipt of a carer’s allowance (Oireachtas Debates, 17 June 2014.) In 2015, the rate
of payment was e204 per week.
17For married couples, there is a kink in the marginal tax rate at the lower-earning spouse
threshold. In 2015, the lower-earning spousal threshold was e24,800.
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observations from the sample as they are not liable for the notches.
1.4.2 Bunching (Levels)
The first evidence of taxpayer responses can be seen from histograms of the income
distribution about a notch. Figure 1.1 shows the clear bunching of people earning
between e25,991 and e26,000 in 2008.18 The green dots indicate the empirical
distribution of earnings about a notch at e26,000, represented by the vertical red
line. Earnings are grouped into e10 bins.















25,490 25,690 25,890 26,090 26,290 26,490
Income
Extent of excess bunching b= 7.5 (0.6)
Bunching (Levels) in 2008
The vertical axis measures the total number of people in the 2008 data reporting incomes in the
e10 bins defined by the horizontal axis. Note the large spike in the number of people earning an
income that just avoids the tax liability triggered by passing the notch threshold.
18All notches relate to income exceeding the threshold. Therefore incomes in 2008 of e25,999 or
e26,000 were essentially equivalent for tax purposes, but substantially different from an income of
e26,001.
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Figure 1.1 also includes a high-order polynomial of best fit around the empirical
distribution excluding a small window about the notch.19 This method is original
to Chetty, Friedman, Olsen and Pistaferri (2011).20 By comparing the true size of
the bins with the size predicted by the polynomial, we can compute the excess mass





β0i · (Zj)i +
R∑
i=−R
γ0i · 1[Zj = i] + 0j (1.1)
where Bj is the number of individuals in income bin j, Zj is income relative to the
notch thresholds in e10 intervals, q is the order of the polynomial, and R denotes
the width of the excluded region around the notch. As with Chetty et al. (2011), I
find that the results are not particularly sensitive to the precise specification of the
counterfactual, i.e. to small changes in q or R.
We can compare the ratio of the excess number of people to the left of the notch
to the number of people predicted by the polynomial. This provides our estimate
of the rate of excess bunching b. Bootstrapped standard errors for this estimate
are included in parentheses. We can see clear evidence of excess bunching that
is statistically significant at all conventional levels. Level-bunching graphs for all
notches are included in Appendix A.
1.4.3 Bunching (Differences)
Although the excess bunching is clear in the previous section, it is not apparent
whether the bunching is caused by the notch. The requirement needed for parameter
identification in level-bunching estimation is that the earnings distribution would be
19The provision for estimation excluding a small window permits non-precise bunching.
20I am indebted to Tore Olsen for generously sharing the code for this portion of the paper.
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flat absent the notch. This assumption is routinely made in the literature (Saez,
2010; Kleven and Waseem, 2013).
However, this assumption is likely violated by several real-world features, the
most prominent of which is round-number bunching. Round-number bunching oc-
curs when there is excess mass in the income distribution at numbers such as e25,000.
Casual inspection of the earnings distribution in Appendix D shows very strong evi-
dence for round-number bunching. Furthermore, the extent of round-number bunch-
ing is not uniform across different round-numbers (for example, there is considerably
more bunching at e26,000 than e27,000) and therefore dummy variables capturing
round-numbering are unlikely to adequately control for this phenomenon.
The nature of the quasi-experimental variation in this paper, namely that the
location of notch thresholds change over time, naturally leads towards an analysis
not in levels but in differences. This permits a more compelling identification strat-
egy than the levels-bunching estimation previously employed in the literature. In
particular, the identification assumption for this estimator is that the change in the
income distribution would have been flat absent the introduction of the notch. The
difference-bunching approach eliminates concerns about round-number bunching un-
der the assumption that the level of round-number bunching is not changing from
one year to the next.
More formally, suppose we can represent the number of people reporting an in-
come in bin i at time t as
Bit = ai + βX it + it
where ai represents a fixed effect for the income bin i that allows inter alia that bin
i includes a round-number, X is an indicator variable for whether the bin contains
a tax notch, and  is unexplained error. Without changes in X, it is not possible to
18
separately identify a from X. Therefore, identification of β requires that E [X ′] = 0
implying that there is no excess bunching inherent to that particular bin. This
will be violated if round number bunching is prevalent, e.g. if the notch occurs at




+β∆X it + ∆it
As ai is a fixed effect, first differences removes any “inherent” excess bunching.
By moving from levels to changes, the exclusion restriction is eased substantially.
Parameter identification now requires that, relative to the prior year, the excess
mass at any particular bin is zero in expectation. Figure 1.2 shows the effect of
introducing the notch remains clear in differences.
Figure 1.2 portrays the change in the number of people reporting income in a
particular bin between 2007 and 2008. The polynomial of best fit confirms that the
expected change in any particular bin is approximately zero. This is equivalent to
satisfying a stationarity assumption. There is a clear spike for the e26,000 bin which
is consistent with taxpayers reporting incomes to avoid exceeding notch thresholds.
The counter-factual estimates are still generated as per Equation (1.1). Under
stationarity the expected change in the number of people in a bin is zero. As the
counterfactual has mean zero, it is inappropriate to calculate excess bunching as the
ratio of actual bunching to expected bunching. Consequently my measure of excess
bunching b is the difference between bi and E [bi]. Inference in the difference-bunching
estimator is conducted against a null hypothesis of H0 : b = 0 and the calculated
bootstrapped standard errors are included in parentheses. There is clear, obvious,
and significant bunching in the early years.
It is at this point of the paper that we begin to analyze taxpayer responses over
19














25,490 25,690 25,890 26,090 26,290 26,490
Income
Extent of excess bunching b=153.6 (18.8)
Bunching (Differences) in 2008
The vertical axis measures the change in the number of people reporting incomes in the e10 bins
defined by the horizontal axis between 2007 and 2008. Note the large spike in the number of people
earning an income that just avoids the tax liability triggered by passing the notch threshold.
the cycle. We have seen clear evidence of tax-advantageous reporting through 2008.
September 2008 saw Lehman Brothers declaring bankruptcy, one of the iconic triggers
precipitating the Great Recession. In June 2008, the unemployment rate in Ireland
was 6%. Within a year of the collapse of Lehman, unemployment had reached 12.9%.
It would continue to rise through 2010-2011 until peaking at 15.1% in early 2012,
finally dipping below 10% only in 2015. The 2009 tax year also saw two notches in
Ireland: the retention of the notch21 at e26,000 and the introduction of the Income
Levy notch at e15,028. Figures 1.3 and 1.4 plot the difference-bunching estimates
for these notches.
In stark contrast to the prior years, the evidence of manipulation disappears
21Although the threshold remained the same, the tax penalty for exceeding the e26,000 notch
increased from e520 to e867.
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in 2009. Note that the vertical axes in Figures 1.3 and 1.4 are the same scale as
Figure 1.2. For the introduction of the new notch at e15,028. There is some excess
bunching near the threshold, but it is not statistically significant and it is an order of
magnitude smaller than the comparable ‘new notch’ estimates from the prior year.
Further evidence is provided for the extant notch at e26,000. One might expect
an additional year of ‘learning’ to increase the number of people bunching at this
threshold. In fact, the differential-bunching estimate is actually negative: despite
an increase of the liability from e520 to e867 and the additional year for ‘learning’,
fewer people report incomes in the relevant e10 bin than the previous year.
The pattern continues in subsequent years. After 2008, there is no evidence
of manipulation of reported incomes about the notches. The full set of figures is
included in Appendix B.














25,490 25,690 25,890 26,090 26,290 26,490
Income
Extent of excess bunching b=-20.3 (10.0)
Bunching (Differences) in 2009
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14,520 14,720 14,920 15,120 15,320 15,520
Income
Extent of excess bunching b=15.6 (10.2)
Bunching (Differences) in 2009
Recall that the ETI is the percent change in taxable income over the percent
change in the (net of) tax rate. By creating a dominated region, notches induce
marginal tax rates that exceed 100%. This fact can mechanically result in estimates
of ETI appearing small. As a consequence, adjustments of taxable income by one
or two percent to avoid a large (>100% marginal tax rate) penalty can seem like a
small behavioral response.
However, it must also be noted that large numbers of people report incomes that
lie in the strictly dominated range. Indeed, many more people report a dominated
income than report an income that just avoids the notch. For example, 217 people
(7%) reported an income within ten euro of the threshold in 2007, with 3,019 people
(93%) reporting an income in the dominated range.22 Although this proportion falls
quite dramatically (e.g. to 2% for the income levy in 2009) the proportion of people
22The 7% figure is inclusive of those reporting that same income in the year prior to the notch.
My estimate of those actually responding the notch is closer to 5%.
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responding to these notches remains small throughout the entire period. This will
further tend to make the absolute level of the behavioral response appear small.
Consequently I argue that most insight can be gained from comparing responses
over the cycle, and thus that the relative responses are the best point of comparison.
Nonetheless, it is informative to directly estimate the ETI for these notches. Doing so
requires assumptions on the counterfactual, namely over incomes that the responders
would have earned absent the notch. In particular, Kleven and Waseem (2013)
show that a reduced form elasticity can be estimated by placing an upper-bound
on the incomes at which people respond to the notch. For illustrative purposes
suppose, absent the notch, that responders would have been uniformly distributed
between the notch threshold and an interval six times the size the dominated region.
The dominated region is typically about e500, so this is comparable to assuming
that people do not respond to the notch if they earn more than e3,000 above the
threshold.23 Under this counterfactual, we can estimate an ETI of about 0.06 for
those that respond.24 Of course if only 10% of people are responding, then the
estimates of ETI for the full population will be ten times smaller; if nobody responds
to the notch, the estimated ETI will be zero. I find that the fraction responding
varies from 5.2%-5.4% in 2007–2008, to less than 1% in the subsequent years.
1.4.4 Kolmogorov-Smirnov Tests
Under an assumption of stationarity, the difference-bunching estimates above
provide a clean test of excess bunching at the specified notch point. This section
performs a similar test but generalizes the test to differences in distributions rather
23Changes in this assumption will of course change the estimates of ETI. For example, assuming
responders come only from the dominated region is equivalent to assuming Leontief preferences.
24The implied marginal tax rate for the median agent in this range is 28%, an increase from
the pre-notch rate of 20%. Using the notation of Kleven and Waseem and defining the income
upper-bound as six times the dominated region, then for the median responder ∆z?/z? u 0.077.
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than differences at a particular point in distributions. Further, it relaxes the station-
arity requirement. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) statistic is a non-parametric way
of comparing two distributions. The KS procedure finds the largest gap between the
two distributions, and for this reason it is applicable to testing for bunching. Under
a null of two empirical densities being equal, the KS statistic then tests if the largest
difference is statistically significant.
The KS test relaxes the stationarity assumption as it compares two probability
densities rather than two unscaled histograms. Therefore the test is immune to a
multiplying the income distribution by a scalar, i.e. it is immune to transformations
that do not affect the relative magnitude of different bins within the window. A
related advantage of the KS test is that the test-statistic is a form of rank test, i.e.
it is completely distribution free.
Formally let F (x) and G(x) be two empirical distribution functions of sample
sizes nF and nG with a null H0 : F (x) = G(x). For our purposes these distributions
are the same interval about a notch in the income distribution in adjacent years, e.g.




The idea of the KS statistic is to measure if D is different enough from its expected
value to reject the null. For the calculation of significance, Smirnov (1939) showed











The Kolmogorov-Smirnov results for all years are shown in Table 1.2. Interpre-
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tation of the results is straightforward. The distributions about the notch from 2006
to 2007 return a test statistic of 0.0236, and the p-value easily rejects the null that
the distributions are the same. This means that there is excess mass about the notch
in 2007 relative to 2006. Similarly, we can reject the null of no excess mass moving
from the 2007 to the 2008 income distributions. However, we find no evidence of
excess mass for any year after 2008.
Table 1.2: Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test Results










The table shows the test statistic and p-values of differences in
distributions about the notches from years 2007 through 2010.
The final two rows are for the Income Levy.
1.4.5 Fixed Effect Poisson Estimates
The second estimation procedure used to test for excess bunching is more para-
metric. The difference-bunching method developed in Section 1.4.3 is based on the
changes in the number of people in a e10 income bin. Difference estimates have the
advantage of removing any ‘inherent’ (i.e. time-invariant) properties of particular
bins, such as round-number bunching. An alternative empirical approach is to pro-
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vide each bin with a fixed effect. This will also control for all inherent properties of
the bin. Indeed, when T = 2, first difference estimation is equivalent to fixed effect
estimation.
Particularly when T > 2 there are advantages to pursuing both difference- and
fixed effect-based estimation procedures. The approach of this section does just that.
Borrowing from the RCT literature, we can interpret a notch as a treatment and test
if the treatment has a statistically significant effect on the number of people reporting
incomes near the affected bin:
Bit = ai + δt + βX it + it
where Bit is the number of people in income bin i at time t, ai is a bin fixed effect,
δt is a year fixed effect, X it is an indicator of treatment status, and  represents an
error term. One can estimate this model using OLS with bin fixed effects, but as the
number of people in a bin is a count (i.e. a discrete number) it is more appropriate
to place restrictions on the error term.25
One such structure is provided by the Poisson fixed effect model (Cameron and
Trivedi, 2005). The primary advantage of this method is that the estimation is based
on changes in the number of people in a bin, and therefore round-number bunching is
captured by the bin fixed effects. The Poisson FE estimator is unusual in nonlinear
panel models in that does not suffer from an incidental parameters problem. Formally




25As a practical matter, the effects reported below are relatively unresponsive to changes in the
estimation procedure.
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Defining λit = exp(x
′
itβ),
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where again λit = exp(x
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The results of the estimation are shown in Table 1.3. The coefficients of a Pois-
son regression are slightly complex: in particular β = log(c1) − log(c0) where ci is
the expected count of people in an income bin depending on whether the dummy
treatment variable is 1 or 0. For this reason I exponentiate the coefficients so they




of the IRR is the factor increase in the count of people in the particular income bin.
For example, an IRR of 1.3 indicates a 30% increase in the count of people in the
income bin. The null hypothesis for inference is H0 : IRR = 1. Standard errors are
robust to heteroskedasticity.
Column 1 is the primary column in the table, and shows the treatment effects for
each year. For example, the coefficient on the Health Levy 2006 dummy indicates
that there was more than twice as many people in the effect income bin while that
treatment lasted. Consistent with all previous evidence, we find that the responses
27
Table 1.3: Poisson FE Estimation (with placebos)
Incidence Rate Ratios
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Health Levy 2006 2.161∗∗∗ 2.289∗∗∗ 2.183∗∗∗ 2.223∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019)
Health Levy 2007 2.473∗∗∗ 2.443∗∗∗ 2.555∗∗∗ 2.627∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.022) (0.023) (0.024)
Health Levy 2008 1.374∗∗∗ 1.374∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.012)
Health Levy 2009 1.422∗∗∗ 1.422∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.011)
Health Levy 2010 1.548∗∗∗ 1.548∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.013)
Income Levy 2009 1.330∗∗∗ 1.299∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.010)
Income Levy 2010 1.317∗∗∗ 1.286∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.011)
USC 2012 1.005 0.997 1.030∗∗∗ 0.986∗
(0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008)
USC 2013 0.936∗∗∗ 0.928∗∗∗ 0.960∗∗∗ 0.918∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008)
Income Bin & Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year of Focus All 2008 2009 2010
N 17760 13320 13320 13320
Table shows the results of Poisson (fixed effect) regression of the effect of
notches on the count of people in income bins that avoid the threshold. Co-
efficients are scaled to incidence rate ratios (IRRs), representing the factor in-
crease in counts. An IRR of one indicates no effect of the treatment. Column
1 includes all years. Treatment effects pre-2008 are several times larger than
treatment effects post-2008. Columns 2 through 4 are ‘placebo regressions’
which test if the results are robust to omitting years.
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are significantly larger in early years. The treatment effects are approximately three
times as large prior to 2008 than they are afterwards.
Recall that the USC and Income Levy tax penalties are lower in absolute terms
than those for the Health Levy. Therefore, if we think there may be fixed costs of
adjusting reported income, we may expect a lower incidence ratio for the later Levies
than for the Health Levy. However this alone can not explain the pattern of results
in Table 1.3.
The largest absolute tax penalties were enforced by the Health Levy between
2008 and 2010, with the penalty in 2010 (e1,040) being more than twice as large
as the penalty in 2007 (e499). Despite this, the treatment effect is much larger for
the 2007 notch than the 2010 notch. This fact is inconsistent with a fixed cost of
adjustment explanation.
Table 1.3 also includes placebo tests of the muted responses post-2008. As the
Health Levy threshold at e26,000 did not vary between 2008 and 2010, one might
be tempted to think that the fixed effect for the e26,000 income bin is misleadingly
inflated by the repeated treatment. This is incorrect. A simple demonstration of this
is shown in Columns 2 through 4 where the specification is run omitting ‘repeated’
years. Although this changes the coefficients, they are only affected after the fourth
decimal place; therefore the results are essentially identical. The repeated threshold
does not unduly inflate the fixed effect to the detriment of the subsequent treatment
effects. The coefficients truly are smaller during the recession.
1.4.6 Who Bunches?
Under the innocuous assumptions that income is increasing in hours worked and
that individuals enjoy leisure, notches create regions of the income distribution that
are strictly dominated by lower pre-tax incomes. By substituting labor for leisure to
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escape the tax penalty, individuals can increase both consumption and leisure.
One striking feature of the bunching estimates is the pervasiveness of suboptimal
behavior. Even though bunching is clearly observed in the pre-recession years, more
people report income in the strictly dominated region than in an interval just below
the notch threshold. This has been found in previous research (Kleven and Waseem,
2013; Chetty et al., 2011) and attributed to broadly defined optimization frictions.
While it is obvious that the characteristics of the employee will determine reported
income, the nature of tax system administration in Ireland means it is likely that
the characteristics of the employer also play a role. One contribution of this paper
is to provide insight into the employee-employer matches that display suboptimal
behavior.
Defining a particular notch threshold as x, we have observed excess bunching to
the left of x. Consequently let us call anyone whose annual income Y is close to
(within e100) but below the threshold x, i.e. Y ∈ (x− 100, x] as a “buncher”. Who
are the bunchers? Who are the “non-bunchers”, whose income gross income lies in
the strictly dominated region?
Dominated Region =

1 if income in dominated region
0 if income ∈ (Threshold-e100, Threshold]
One useful feature of the dataset is the inclusion of demographic information
on the individuals and basic characteristics on the employers. For employees, the
relevant demographics are age, nationality, and sex.26 On the employer side, the most
important variables are the number of employees, industry (NACE code), and legal
structure. NACE is the standard industry classification code in Europe, comparable
26Unfortunately no data on e.g. education are made available to researchers.
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to SIC and NAICS in the United States. In particular, the NACE 2 classification
system is used.27 Legal structure captures the form of incorporation.28 Another
variable of interest is the number of weeks during the year the employee worked for
the firm, which I split into an indicator for 52 weeks or not.29
The binary nature of the Dominated Region variable leads naturally to the stan-
dard analytical approaches for limited dependent variables, namely probit and logit
models (Wooldridge, 2002). Formally, suppose a latent variable y?i = xiβ + i
where the error i ∼ N (0, 1) and is independent of xi. Then the realization in
the data yi = 1 [y
?
i > 0]. The distribution of yi given xi, then, is P (yi = 1|xi) =
P (y?i > 0|xi) = P (xiβ + i > 0|xi) = P (i > −xiβ|xi) = Φ(xiβ) where Φ(·) de-
notes the standard normal cumulative distribution function for the probit model.
The logit model is essentially the same as probit, but rather than Φ(·) denoting
the standard normal, the operational assumption is that the errors follow a logis-
tic distribution implying that Φ(a) = exp(a)
1+exp(a)
. Though some instrument would be
needed to ascertain causality, estimating the determinants provides insight into the
characteristics of those who list incomes in a strictly dominated region relative to a
tax-advantaged region. Table 1.4 shows the determinants of reporting income as tax-
advantaged or in the strictly dominated region. Due to space constraints I present
results for two examples: the Health Levy, and “any notch”. The odd-numbered
columns in Table 1.4 show estimates using the probit model, and the even-numbered
columns show comparable figures using logits. Positive coefficients indicate a greater
27The NACE 2 classification system is a four-digit industry identifier. For example, 85 indicates
“Education”, 855 indicates “Other education”, and 8553 indicates “Driving school activities”.
28Individual proprietorship; Partnership; Co-operative society; Public Limited Company; Private
Unlimited Company; Private Limited Company; Statutory Body; Branch of a Foreign Company;
Other. There is substantial heterogeneity within and between, say, individual proprietorships and
public limited companies. Unfortunately, most companies that would be generally classified as
foreign-owned are registered for the purposes of taxation as domestic in Ireland, and thus few firms
are registered as foreign-held.
29The qualitative interpretation is the same if weeks is used in the continuous form.
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likelihood of registering income in the strictly dominated region.
The results are largely consistent with a model that smaller firms in informal
sectors are more likely to report tax-advantageous incomes, similar to results found
in Feldman and Slemrod (2007). Having multiple jobs makes one less likely to report
a tax-advantaged income. One possible cause is that switching employers mid-year
makes precise control of annual income more difficult.30 Consistent with this result,
working with an employer for fifty-two weeks of the year implies one is much less
likely to be in the strictly dominated region.
Different forms of legal incorporation are strongly associated with different report-
ing behaviors. The legal incorporation coefficients are relative to the base of ‘Sole
proprietorships’. The more informal forms of business (sole proprietorships, small
partnerships, etc.) increase the likelihood of reporting income in the tax-advantaged
region. All coefficients are positive and significant, implying that employees of sole
proprietors are the most able to adjust incomes. Sole proprietors are generally smaller
companies, and this is consistent with the positive coefficient on firm size. Working
for a larger firm makes a person more likely to be in the dominated region. This is
perhaps due to the increased transaction costs of renegotiating with many employees
through a HR department rather than on the relatively ad-hoc basis available to less
established firms. The effect is small, although it is precisely estimated.
The sectoral indicators are relative to the retail/wholesale industry. The sectors
with negative coefficients relative to retail, and therefore the sectors with the lowest
tendency to report incomes in the dominated region, are construction and agriculture.
In both of these sectors, substantive portions of business are conducted in informal
settings. The sectors with the largest positive coefficients are utilities and public
30It is also more likely that income trajectories (“career concerns”) are more relevant for those
that actively switch employers.
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Table 1.4: Determinants of Exceeding Notch Thresholds
Health Levy Any Notch
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Personal Characteristics Number of employers 0.019??? 0.021??? 0.006 0.006
Irish 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
EU 2004 0.020?? 0.021?? 0.020? 0.019??
Male 0.007 0.006 -0.006 -0.006
Fifty-two weeks -0.037??? -0.039??? -0.063??? -0.066???
Age (decade) -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.002
Self-employment -0.160??? -0.148??? -0.210??? -0.205???
Legal Incorporation Partnership 0.037?? 0.036?? 0.042?? 0.042???
Co-Operative 0.053? 0.052? 0.041 0.041
Public Limited 0.102??? 0.105??? 0.082??? 0.082???
Private Unlimited 0.106??? 0.107??? 0.065??? 0.063???
Private Limited 0.054??? 0.053??? 0.040??? 0.039???
Statutory Body 0.062??? 0.063??? 0.023? 0.020
Foreign Branch 0.100??? 0.102??? 0.048?? 0.046??
Other 0.098??? 0.104??? 0.063??? 0.061???
Industry Agriculture -0.035 -0.036 -0.017 -0.016
Utilities 0.042 0.044 0.042 0.042
Construction -0.030??? -0.032??? -0.029?? -0.030??
Wholesale/retail -0.020?? -0.020?? 0.007 0.008
Transport -0.023 -0.024 -0.005 -0.005
Hotels/restaurants -0.032?? -0.033?? 0.029?? 0.030??
Information Technology 0.015 0.014 0.003 0.002
Finance 0.020 0.019 0.007 0.006
Real estate -0.011 -0.008 -0.008 -0.006
Professional/scientific -0.008 -0.010 -0.012 -0.012
Admin and support -0.008 -0.010 0.010 0.010
Public Administration 0.032?? 0.032? 0.030?? 0.030?
Education 0.002 0.001 0.012 0.014
Health/social work 0.004 0.002 0.011 0.012
Arts -0.008 -0.008 -0.006 -0.005
Other service -0.028 -0.028 0.000 0.001
Within house/other 0.008 0.009 0.027 0.030
Firm Size Employees (’000s) 0.002?? 0.002? 0.002??? 0.002???
Workforce separation (%) 0.000 0.000 0.000? 0.000??
Sample Size 20,625 20,625 33,508 33,508
Wald χ2 787.6 815.4 2955.1 2790.3
(Pseudo-)R2 0.059 0.059 0.084 0.084
Table shows average marginal effects for Probit (odd-numbered columns) and Logit (even-numbered) regressions
on reporting an income that fell in the strictly dominated tax-disadvantaged region relative to reporting income
below but within e100 of the notch threshold. All regressions include year fixed effects and are clustered at the
individual level. Legal incorporation effects are relative to a base value of Sole proprietorships. Industry effects are
relative to a base value of Manufacturing.
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administration. The utilities in Ireland are almost own state-owned enterprises.
Construction firms avoid taxes, but government agencies do not. This finding is
consistent with Paulus (2015).
Men are more likely to be in the dominated region for the Health Levy than
women, but less likely to be in the dominated region for other notches. This result is
perhaps surprising, given the evidence that women have a larger labor supply elas-
ticity (Devereux, 2004). Irish people are slightly more likely to be in the dominated
region than non-natives, but this result is not significant. Citizens of countries that
only joined the EU in 2004, who generally have little experience with the Irish tax
system, are more likely to report tax disadvantaged incomes.
Overall we conclude that the characteristics of both employer and employee (the
“employer-employee pairing”) predict reporting behavior. The importance of this
result becomes more apparent when one considers the employer-employee matches
most likely to be affected by the economic downturn in Ireland.
1.4.7 Counterfactual Estimates
As emphasized above, Ireland experienced severe business cycle volatility between
2006 and 2013. The changes in the labor market were stark. Unemployment rose
from 4.9% at the start of 2008 to 13.1% by January 2010. It peaked at 15.2% in
2012. Further, the high unemployment rate omits the large number of discouraged
workers: in a country with a population of 4.5 million, the labor force declined by
340,000 people.
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The effect was widespread but fell disproportionately on the construction sector,
an industry traditionally associated with employment of younger men. Figure 1.5
shows that the level of employment in all non-construction sectors was approximately
constant over the decade, whereas the numbers employed in construction fell by more
than half.
The method developed in DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1996), hereinafter “DFL”,
is well-suited to a decomposition of bunching at notches and has been used previ-
ously in the literature (Onji, 2009). Rather than bluntly removing certain segments
of the data, the DFL technique asks what would the income distribution look like in
year t had it the characteristics from year t− 1.
The DFL decomposition is a generalization of the method of Oaxaca and Blinder.
The Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition can be seen as measuring how the average pay
of how one group (e.g. women) would be paid if they had another group’s (e.g.
men’s) characteristics. Instead of focusing attention exclusively on the mean, the
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DFL technique generalizes this intuition to the entire distribution of wages.
When applied to this paper, the DFL technique constructs a counterfactual wage
density after the introduction of a notch had the employer-employee attributes re-
mained as they were before the notch. That is, it decomposes the excess bunch-
ing into a component explained by changes in the characteristics of the employer-
employee match and an unexplained residual component. The component explained
by differences in attributes is the gap between the actual post-notch distribution and
the generated counterfactual distribution. The residual component is attributed as
due to the notch.
Consider the case of the introduction of a notch in 2007. The question is not
just how the wage distribution changed between 2006 and 2007, but to disentangle
the changes in the composition of the labor force from the excess bunching due to
the introduction of the notch itself. The formal explanation below follows DiNardo
(2002). From the definition of conditional probability, note that we can define the




f 2006(y|x)h(x|t = 2006)dx∫
f 2007(y)dy ≡
∫
f 2007(y|x)h(x|t = 2007)dx
Now consider the distribution of wages in 2007 if the covariates x had the same
distribution as in 2006, and compare it to the actual distribution of wages in 2007:
Counterfactual f 20072006 (y) ≡
∫
f 2007(y|x)h(x|t = 2006)dx
Actual f 20072007 (y) ≡
∫
f 2007(y|x)h(x|t = 2007)dx
Note that the counterfactual described differs from its actual distribution only in
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what set of x variables are to be “integrated over”. In general h(x) will have several
explanatory variables and integration over several covariates could be impossible.
As in the Oaxaca-Blinder case, the key will be to define a weight θ such that
∫
f 2007(y|x)h(x|t = 2006)dx =
∫
θf 2007(y|x)h(x|t = 2007)dx
Such a weight would transform a potentially impossible problem into a relatively
simple one: weighting the 2007 distribution. To do so, pool the 2006 and 2007 data
and observe that by definition:
h(xj = x0) =
h(xj|t = 2006)P2006
P(t = 2007|xj = x0)
h(xj = x0) =
h(xj|t = 2007)P2007
P(t = 2007|xj = x0)
where P2007 is the probability that the observation is from 2007 and
ρ2007(x) ≡ P(t = 2007|xj = x0)
ρ2006(x) ≡ P(t = 2006|xj = x0)
are the propensity scores associated with being either post- or pre-notch. The insight
here is that propensity scores are much easier to integrate over than multidimen-
sional objects like h(xj|t = 2006). Estimates for ρ can be generated from a logit
of the pooled data with the year of notch introduction (or previous year) being the
dependent variable. The predicted probability from the logit is an estimate of the
propensity score.
The actual and counterfactual distributions differ only in the h(·) term. The
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weight is a function of the propensity score and two constants:
Counterfactual f 20072006 ≡
∫









f 2007(y|x)h(x|t = 2006)dx
=
∫
θf 2007(y|x)h(x|t = 2007)dx
DiNardo et al. (1996) propose estimating ρˆ2006 with a probit or a logit, and using the
results to construct sampling weights θˆi. Normalizing these weights so that they sum
to unity lets the researcher construct counterfactual (kernel-based) wage densities.
Figures 1.6 and 1.7 show these counterfactual densities for the notches from 2007
and 2010. The figures have three lines. The first two are the actual observed densities
before and after the introduction of the notch. We observe excess bunching about
the notch the year of its introduction. The dotted line represents the counterfactual
estimates. The counterfactual is constructed by scaling the original distribution
based on changes in the characteristics of the employer-employee match. The gap
between the actual distribution post-notch and the counterfactual is the unexplained
residual component. As we can see in Figure 1.6, the counterfactual can explain a
considerable portion of the gap between the two empirical densities, albeit with some
excess bunching remaining.
This evidence indicates that the composition bias can explain much of the ob-
served change in densities. However Figure 1.7 provides a less compelling case.
Although the counterfactual can explain approximately half of the difference in dis-
tributions, the relative size of the residual component has increased substantially
relative to Figure 1.6. This provides initial evidence that the composition effect
alone cannot explain the cyclicality in responses, and that there may be additional
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constraints on behavior over the cycle.











Actual (pre) Actual (post) Counterfactual 
Controls: male age irish emp_size legal_form sector fiftytwo
DFL Density Estimates 2006-2007
Counterfactual wage density from 2006 to 2007. Accounting for changes in the characteristics of
the employer-employee match explains much of the difference in the empirical distributions.












Actual (pre) Actual (post) Counterfactual 
Controls: male age irish emp_size legal_form sector fiftytwo
DFL Density Estimates 2009-2010
Figure 1.7 shows the counterfactual wage density from 2009 to 2010. Changes in the covariates do
a less impressive job matching the 2010 density.
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1.4.8 Reweighted Estimates
The preceding analysis suggests that the changes in the labor force can explain
much of the cyclical pattern in bunching behavior. For example, the recession dis-
proportionately affected construction workers who were relatively adept at avoiding
the notch. However the counterfactuals’ explanatory power are far from perfect; a
residual exists. This section investigates the residual component. Exactly how much
of the change in bunching can be explained by changes in the composition of the
labor force? Holding the composition of the labor force fixed, do the predictors of
bunching themselves change over the cycle? Do conditions change for those that
kept their jobs?
Although the labor market changed most dramatically for those that lost their
jobs, there is no question that conditions also changed for those that remained in
employment. For example, within the constant subset of employees who remained
matched with the same firm, Table 1.5 shows that the dynamics of wage setting
changed dramatically over the period.
Table 1.5: Changes in wage dynamics for job-stayers
Year Proportion Freezes Proportion Cuts Proportion Increases
2005-06 2.5% 17.2% 80.4%
2006-07 2.5% 17.6% 79.9%
2007-08 2.8% 22.9% 74.2%
2008-09 3.3% 52.7% 44.0%
2009-10 4.4% 55.2% 40.3%
2010-11 6.8% 39.3% 53.9%
2011-12 10.3% 34.2% 55.5%
2012-13 10.0% 34.3% 55.7%
Table shows the proportion of job-stayers whose pay was frozen within ±0.1% of
previous year’s pay, cut, or increased. Source: Doris et al. (2013)
This table shows, each year, the percent of “job-stayers”31 who faced wage freezes,
31Job-stayers are people who remained in employment with the same firm over the entire sample.
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cuts, or increases. There are several noteworthy features of this table. Primarily, we
note that a majority of workers received cuts to nominal pay in both 2009 and 2010.
This shows a remarkable degree of flexibility in the labor market. The fact that
a labor market with such wage flexibility saw a dramatic decrease in the extensive
margin of labor demand has been the source of research (Doris et al., 2013).
It is also remarkable that the proportion of people experiencing pay-freezes quadru-
pled between 2007 and 2012. Albeit determined by the nature of proportions, the
final column confirms that the proportion receiving pay increases halved between
2006 and 2010. These are clear indicators that the circumstances of employment
substantially changed over the period, even for those that saw no perturbation in
their employer-employee match. This table confirms the intuitive notion that re-
cessions affect not just the circumstances of those that lose their job, but also the
circumstances of people that remain in employment.
In this section I investigate this further by reweighting the analysis for pre- and
post-recession workers. In this respect, we compare the post-recession sample as if
they had the same observable characteristics as the pre-recession sample. Conditional
on the effectiveness of the reweighting procedure, this holds the composition of the
labor force constant between the two periods. This provides a sense of the importance
of compositional effects.
Any two samples can be reweighted to look similar to each other in observed
characteristics. I present 2006 and 2010 for illustrative purposes, as they represent
two years of the same notch (the Health Levy) either side of 2008. This reweighting
is achieved through inverse probability weighting. Inverse probability weighting is a
procedure wherein observations are given weights according to their probability of
attriting from the sample based on their covariates. For example, 2010 observations
who work in construction are given additional weight to compensate for the loss of
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jobs in construction between 2006 and 2010. I base the reweighting on covariates
that are less controllable by worker alone: age, gender, Irish citizenship, form of
incorporation, and sector. The results are surprisingly insensitive to variations of this
procedure, e.g. including firm size as a matching variable. In an effort to statistically
decompose as much of the variation as possible, I also reweight based on a full suite
of characteristics (full-time status, number of employers, self-employment status,
age, nationality, sex, firm size, firm sector, legal form of incorporation, workforce
separation percentage), though these additional variables do not alter explanatory
power substantially.
Table 1.6 shows how the reweighted 2010 sample compares to the 2006 sample.
The analysis is restricted to people who earned between e20,000 and e30,000. The
procedure does a good job: the characteristics are quite similar. For example, recall
from Figure 1.5 that the fraction of workers employed in construction decreased by
about half (from 11% to 6%) between 2006 and 2010. After reweighting the 2010
sample, the difference is closer to 1%.
Table 1.6: Sample means after re-weighting
2006 2010 Difference
Age 35.6 35.6 0.07
Self-employed (%) 4.1 4.6 0.5
Irish (%) 67.6 67.8 0.25
Construction (%) 11.3 12.3 1.01
Male (%) 53.2 53.7 0.52
Firm size 1,461 1,244 217
Table shows the means of key variables after reweighting the
2010 sample to have the same characteristics as the 2006 sample.
Using the reweighted sample, we can analyze the determinants of bunching ab-
sent any bias due to changes in labor force composition. Table 1.7 presents evidence
42




Number of employers 0.0089 0.0218?
Firm Size (’000s) -0.0009 0.0056??
Fifty-two weeks -0.0335?? 0.0267???




EU 2004 0.0298 0.0495???
Workforce separation (%) -0.0004?? 0.0006???
Table shows selected mean marginal effects from probit regression on
the determinants of bunching. The first column shows the results for
the notch at e22,880 in 2006. The second column shows the results for
the 2010 notch, but with the results weighted so the covariates match
those of the 2006 sample.
that the economic environment of those that remained in employment changed, and
in particular that the determinants of bunching varied. The first column of results in
Table 1.7 shows the marginal effects of a selection of covariates from a probit on the
probability of reporting a tax-disadvantaged income in 2006. Recall that, for exam-
ple, self-employed people have a lower probability of reporting a tax-disadvantaged
income. The right-hand column of Table 1.7 presents the results for the 2010, but
reweighting the sample to ‘look like’ the 2006 sample. We can thus interpret the
right-hand column of Table 1.7 as the determinants of bunching “as if the composi-
tion of the labor force were unchanged” from 2006.
The overall impression is similar, but note that the coefficients do change. For
example, although neither are substantially different from zero, the marginal effect of
having multiple employers approximately doubles. Note also that the the marginal
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effect of workforce separation32 switches sign. This could indicate that the nature of
separations vary, for example from voluntary to enforced, between 2006 and 2010.
The self-employment indicator is highly significant and is the largest absolute deter-
minant in both specifications, but the size of the effect doubles.
It is reassuring that the results between the 2006 sample and the 2010 reweighted
sample largely coincide.33 Nonetheless, the marginal effects move a non-trivial
amount. As discussed above, workforce separation (and full-time status) change
sign in an important way. Many coefficients (number of employers, firm size, male,
citizen of EU 2004 enlargement countries) move from statistically insignificant to sig-
nificant. As discussed in the context of the pre-recession determinants of bunching,
one strategy the literature has proposed that may rationalize reporting an income in
the dominated region is ‘career concerns’, i.e. that the long-term benefits of main-
taining a given wage may outweigh the short-term tax consequences. Similarly, it
is likely that long-term stability may be closer to the fore during a recession. For
example, suppose demanding a renegotiation of wages increases the probability of
losing a job; then, if outside options are lower during a recession, it may be rational
for people to forego salary renegotiations despite short-term tax consequences.
Controlling for selection through inverse probability weighting also permits es-
timating the treatment effect of recession on taxpayer responsiveness. Holding the
composition of the labor force constant, how much more likely are people to report
an income in the dominated region during the recession? In the illustrative example
of comparing responses to the Health Levy in 2006 and 2010, I find a treatment effect
of about 25%. Specifically, I estimate an Average Treatment Effect (ATE) of 4.09%
on a base of 16.23%. The interpretation is that after controlling for attrition from
32The fraction of employees who separate from the firm in that year.
33I include the ‘fifty-two weeks’ variable, which changes sign, as indication that this is not uni-
formly the case.
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the labor force, 12% of people would be responsive to this notch during a recession
versus 16% pre-recession. The ATE of 4.09% is estimated on a full suite of explana-
tory variables; using only information on industrial sector to control for attrition
changes this number of 4.69%, a non-trivial but not particularly substantial amount.
In all specifications, approximately 25% of the change in bunching behavior cannot
be explained by changes in characteristics. The remainder is due to unobservables
and changes in the magnitude of the marginal effects of observables.
One explanation is that it is harder to find opportunities to avoid taxes during
recessions, for example by switching jobs or working a different number of hours.
Owners and managers may be less receptive to worker requests when labor is in
abundant supply, or if they suspect the firm is not viable in the long run. If workers’
outside options are lowered during a recession, they may be less likely raise second-
order considerations with their employer. Alternatively, social norms may constrain
renegotiation of wages during a time of redundancies. Indeed, it is plausible that a
sense of national crisis may enhance people’s willingness to contribute to taxation.
These are far from the only possible explanations; many other plausible interpreta-
tions exist to could help explain the changes in bunching behavior. It is likely that
several factors play a role.
1.5 Conclusion
This paper identifies how the response of taxpayers to sharp changes in income
tax liabilities (“notches”) depends on the phase of the business cycle. Notches induce
marginal tax rates in excess of 100%, and thus they provide very strong incentives to
adjust reported income. I investigated the response using administrative tax return
data from the universe of employees in Ireland. As the decline in output in Ireland
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during the Great Recession was four times more severe than in the United States, the
responses to tax incentives there provide a clear test of behavior over the business cy-
cle. Further, the identifying variation—changes in those notch thresholds—facilitates
an identification strategy that was not possible in comparable studies where thresh-
olds remain constant.
There is unambiguous evidence of tax-advantageous reporting behavior in the
pre-recession period. The signs of income manipulation are not present after 2008.
Estimating the magnitude of responses to the ‘treatment’ of a new notch shows that
responses are three-to-four times larger at the peak of the cycle than at the trough,
despite the treatment intensity being largest at the height of the recession. This
points to taxpayer responses being smaller during a recession. My estimates of the
elasticity of taxable income are four times larger for 2006 than for 2010.
The characteristics of the employer-employee pairing are good predictors of re-
porting a tax-advantaged income. For example, individuals with self-employment
income tend to successfully avoid exceeding notch thresholds, and construction work-
ers report more tax-advantaged incomes than comparable workers in public utilities.
By focusing on taxable income, we incorporate all margins (both legal and illegal)
that may adjust to taxation.
Non-random attrition from the labor force is a sufficient condition for the elas-
ticity of taxable income to vary over the cycle. Counterfactual wage distributions
indicate that much of the changes in bunching behavior can indeed be explained
by changes in the composition of the labor force: the recession disproportionately
reduced employment in sectors which had previously exhibited above-average ability
to report tax-advantaged incomes. However the predictive power of counterfactuals
is far from complete. Thus the results appear not to be merely a composition effect:
using probability weights to control for changes in the labor force, I demonstrate that
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composition effects are large but the determinants of avoidance behavior themselves
change over the cycle. This is consistent with the presence of additional constraints
on tax reporting behavior during a recession. The precise source of the additional
constraints on behavior can be speculated on. For example, there may be greater
restrictions on hours worked or fewer opportunities to switch jobs during a recession;
there may be additional concerns about wage negotiations while redundancies are
occurring within a firm; or managers in failing firms may be focused on alternative
considerations and relatively less attentive to employee tax matters.
A macroeconomics literature exists about whether the magnitude of the fiscal
multiplier varies over the cycle. This paper identifies an analogous effect on the
revenue collection side. The evidence from Ireland, which experienced severe eco-
nomic volatility between 2006 and 2013, is that the response of taxpayers to changes
in tax rates is substantially lower during a recession. A cycle-dependent taxpayer
response has considerable implications for policy implementation. A decreased tax-
payer response generates a lower deadweight loss of taxation, which implies the costs
of taxation are lower during a recession; alternatively a decreased ability of taxpayers
to avoid taxes suggests less resources need to be allocated to enforcement during a
recession.
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Earnings Distribution, 2006-2007
Histogram of earnings in e50 bins, pooled data from 2006 and 2007. There is clear
round-number bunching for multiples of e1,000.
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CHAPTER II
Political Fragmentation and Fiscal Policy
2.1 Introduction
The paper investigates how legislative fragmentation affects the size of govern-
ment. The conventional wisdom (cf. Weingast et al. (1981) Lijphart (1984), Austen-
Smith (2000), Milesi-Ferretti et al. (2002)) is that a larger number of political parties
leads to an increase in a country’s taxes, spending, and transfers.
This paper makes both theoretical and empirical contributions that challenge the
conventional wisdom. I model the government’s choice of tax rates, public good
provision, and level of transfers as a function of n coalition partners. Like most
models of government, coalitions choose inefficiently high tax rates to fund transfers
to their political allies. The model predicts that an increase in coalition size reduces
this inefficiency. In particular, an increase in coalition size lowers taxes, spending,
and transfers. All three of these predictions are supported in data from a large panel
of OECD countries. I estimate that moving from a two- to three-party legislature
lowers tax revenue by 6.7%, expenditure by 9.5%, and transfers by 5.4%
I first replicate the relationship predicted by the conventional wisdom by exclud-
ing country fixed effects. Excluding country fixed effects is equivalent to assuming
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they all have no effect. Including fixed effects and relaxing this assumption com-
pletely changes the results. Rather than a positive relationship, I find negative and
statistically significant coefficients. These results are robust to a host of potentially
important variables such as the ideological composition of government, changes in
the tax base, and electoral cycle effects.
In 2008 the share of the United States’ total government expenditure over GDP
was 37% while the average for EU countries was 47%. Electoral incentives facing
governments can help explain this variation. The correspondence between politics
and taxes is crucial in determining society’s preferred size of government. This
paper investigates the effect of increased legislative fragmentation (as measured by
the seats-weighted number of parties in parliament) on tax policy, and thus the paper
contributes to understanding the effects of secular fragmentation. Additionally, the
paper has implications for policies to increase the number of political parties, such
as the 2011 electoral reform referendum in the UK.
Research linking political science and tax policy, and the debate about the ‘vari-
eties of capitalism’ (Hall and Soskice, 2001), is not new. The empirical work of Li-
jphart (1984, 1999) showed statistically significant relationships between countries’
number of political parties and tax policies. Lijphart concluded that fragmenta-
tion leads to broad, consensus-based coalitions which cause governments to become
“kindler, gentler”. Investigating the related question of the link between tax pol-
icy and electoral systems, Milesi-Ferretti, Perotti and Rostagno (2002) show that
the proportionality of electoral systems increases public spending and transfers, and
that these results hold even within the subset of proportional representative (PR)
systems. Kontopoulos and Perotti (1999) were firm enough in the expectation that
fragmentation increased expenditure to perform a one-sided test on the coefficient of
interest. More recent research has questioned the robust of these findings (Martin
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and Vanberg, 2013; Ba¨ck and Lindvall, 2015; Heller, 2016).
Theoretical models have drawn similar conclusions to the conventional wisdom.
The ‘Law of 1/n’ (Weingast, Shepsle and Johnsen, 1981) models spending as a func-
tion of the number of districts in a country, and finds that over-spending is increasing
in the number of districts. The ‘veto player’ model (Tsebelis, 2002) focuses on the
ability of a coalition of n ≥ 1 ‘veto players’ to change a policy. The intersection of sets
of desirable policies is defined as the ‘winset’ for this coalition. It is straight-forward
to understand the logic that the winset is decreasing in n. One way to ‘grease the
wheels’ is by increasing the payoffs to veto players, which requires higher taxes in
equilibrium. Austen-Smith (2000) finds that electoral rules that encourage a greater
number parties will head to higher spending and transfers. Therefore these alterna-
tive frameworks draw the same conclusion as the conventional wisdom: increasing
the number of parties makes agreement more difficult, and thus higher spending (e.g.
political pork) results.
The empirical analysis of this paper contradicts this view. Pettersson-Lidbom
(2012) finds similar results from two quasi-experiments in Finland and Sweden. This
paper is the first to draw these conclusions both theoretically and with a dataset
on a large number of developed countries. Although the empirical section may not
be as cleanly identified as a small quasi-experimental setting, the inclusion of many
countries in the analysis reduces concerns about external validity.
2.2 Theoretical Model
The research question of this paper is how a change in the size of an n-member
coalition affects tax policy. More generally, I ask how the collective outcomes for a
group are affected by the size of that group. This setting is a form of a common pool
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problem.
Most public finance common pool models are driven by the disconnect of taxing
power and spending power, cf. Persson and Tabellini (2002). In these models, de-
centralized units choose expenditure levels and the central government raises taxes
to meet the liabilities that fall due. Each decentralized unit, knowing that they will
only have to pay a fraction of an additional dollar of expenditure, increases spending.
This approach is equivalent to the usual public finance assumption of government
requiring an exogenous amount of revenue. Suppose for example that the demand for
some goods becomes less elastic, and so consumers are less responsive to taxes. The
exogenous revenue assumption rules out the possibility of e.g. governments increasing
tax revenue when the excess burden of taxation falls. I do not make this assumption.
I will model the coalition’s choice of policy as type of a common pool problem.
However the coalition will simultaneously choose income and expenditure policies,
and therefore trade off the marginal benefits and marginal costs of taxation. In this
framework taxes and expenditure become endogenous.
There are two types of public good, G1 and G2. The first are the traditional pure
public goods that benefits all of society, e.g. national defence, weather forecasts.
The second are “local public goods” which are particularistic and targeted to one
large group rather than the general public, e.g. agricultural subsidies, social security
transfers. A simpler version of the model with a single type of public good, and
where taxes are determined residually, can be found in Chapter 7 of Persson and
Tabellini (2002).
A government consists of i = 1, . . . , n political groups. Politician i in government
optimizes group i’s welfare. This is the sum of the group’s after tax income (1−τ)Yi,
an increasing and strictly concave function f of the pure public good G1, and an
increasing and strictly concave function g of group i’s local public good G2. For
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convenience I assume that Yi = Y ∀i and that all n parties split G2 equally. The
results hold for more general specifications. Formally, given a national income M ,
the politician optimizes the following problem:
max
G1,G2,τ






s.t. G1 +G2 ≤ τM (2.2)
This formulation that departs from much of the previous literature on policy forma-
tion. For instance, the Weingast, Shepsle and Johnsen (1981) ‘Law of 1/n’ assumes
a norm of reciprocity, which “facilitates a process of mutual support and logrolling”.
This increases inefficient spending in the n number of represented districts. In con-
trast, I make no such assumption. Rather, this formulation is intuitively very simple:
it is a welfare maximization problem. An n-member coalition is formed, this coali-
tion commands a majority, and they agree to maximize the welfare of the groups
that comprise the coalition. This contrasts with other models of government (e.g.
Austen-Smith and Banks (1988), Milesi-Ferretti and Spolaore (1994)) which do not
focus on secular fragmentation. Assumptions about particular norms could of course
facilitate alternative equilibrium outcomes. However, no such outcome could Pareto
dominate the solution offered by this formulation.
The structure of this problem has been chosen as a compromise between tractabil-
ity and generality. For example, for simplicity G2 is defined as a single good, though
it could be generalized to a vector of goods Gi2, i = 1, . . . , N that are more specifically
defined than the current framework permits. Both f(.) and g(.) can be any increas-
ing and concave function. The quasi-linear objective function is additively-separable:
this formulation greatly simplifies the analysis as it eliminates cross-partial deriva-
tives, though I suspect relatively innocuous conditions on these derivatives would
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result in the same substantive conclusion as this model.
It is important to note that I framed the maximization problem as the individual
choice of each of the n politicians. Aggregating the decision up to the group level
is equivalent to multiplying Equation (2.1) by n and not altering the constraint in
(2.2). This would be a monotonic transformation of the original problem and would
not affect the solution. The problem can thus be interpreted either at the level of
the individual politician, or the coalition as a whole. Both interpretations are valid.
The planner’s problem is not a simple rescaling of Equation (2.1). The planner
wants to maximize welfare for all N > n groups in society. As all N groups’ welfare
are affected by tax rates and global public goods, the planner’s problem multiplies
the first two components (but not the third) of the maximand by N . The third com-










s.t. G1 +G2 ≤ τM (2.4)
The solution to this problem leads to the efficient allocation, and our first result.





= Nf ′ (G1).
Proof. Forming a Lagrangian with multiplier λ and taking the first order necessary
condition with respect to τ , we find that λ = NY
M
. The FOCs on G1 and G2 show















= Nf ′ (G1).
The planner chooses spending so that the marginal utility of G1 is N times larger
than the marginal utility of G2. In contrast to the optimal allocation, the solution
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to the government’s problem of Equations (2.1) and (2.2) sees over-provision of G2.
This result is formalized in Propositions 2 and 3.







Proof. Forming a Lagrangian with multiplier λ and taking the first order necessary
condition with respect to τ , we find that λ = Y
M
. The FOCs on G1 and G2 show













= nf ′ (G1).
Proposition 3. The coalition over-provides G2 in equilibrium.
Proof. In both Proposition 1 and Proposition 2, f ′ (G1) = YM . Therefore the provi-





from Nf ′ (G1) in Proposition 1 to nf ′ (G1) in Proposition 2. As n < N , the marginal
utility from G2 is higher under the optimal allocation than when provided by the
coalition. This implies that G2 is lower in the optimal allocation. Therefore the
coalition over-provides G2.
Proposition 4. In equilibrium, the coalition sets a tax rate τ > τ ?.
Proof. From Proposition 3 we see G1 is identical in both scenarios but that the
coalition over-provides G2. Constraint (2.2) implies the government may not run a
deficit, and local non-satiation ensures this becomes a balanced budget rule. With
spending above that implied by the planner’s solution and a balanced budget rule,
the coalition sets tax rates above the optimal level.
These results are reasonably standard. A government of n-coalition partners over-
provides local public goods targeted at its constituents at the cost of excessively high
taxation. These results are not the focus of this paper. Rather this paper asks how
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these results are affected by political fragmentation. I model fragmentation as an
increase in n. Does fracturing of the coalition make the over-provision of G2 worse?
The answer is not immediately clear. With more groups, it is quite intuitive that
demands for group-specific projects grow larger. Conversely, one could argue that a
splintered coalition is forced to shift resources to projects of common agreement. This
could be more desirable than dividing G2 among an ever-larger number of claimants.
In this model, the latter effect is what dominates. Fragmentation lowers taxes
and reduces the over-provision of targeted transfers. These results are somewhat
counter-intuitive and challenge the conventional wisdom that more fragmented po-
litical systems have larger public sectors. The results are formalized in Propositions
5 and 6.
To prove these results it is convenient to reformulate the coalition’s problem.
Recall that the coalition chooses τ,G1, and G2. Assuming the budget constraint
holds with equality, the choice of any two of these variables will determine the third.
Therefore I define α as the fraction of tax revenue devoted to G2, i.e. G2 = ατM .
Consequently the proportion of government revenue allocated to G1 is the comple-
mentary fraction (1− α). By reformulating the coalition’s problem this way, we can
condense it into a single maximand in two variables (α and τ) and three parameters
(Y , M , and n):
max
α,τ





The government chooses tax rate τ . Fraction 1−α of the total revenue τM is spent
on G1. Fraction α is spent on G2, the politically-targeted spending. I refer to α as
“transfer intensity”.























and the following set of second-order and cross-partial derivatives:
∂F1
∂τ































































The comparative statics addressing how policy responds to fragmentation will












































It is instructive at this point to note an assumption of the model. Suppose for
now that α were pre-determined and the government’s only choice variable were τ .
We can see how n affects taxes by computing the sign of ∂
2Π
∂τ∂n
, i.e. computing the
71
sign of Equation (2.8). Clearly −αM
n2
is negative. As g is concave, its first derivative
is positive and its second is negative. The sign of the overall derivative thus depends













There is some ambiguity on this condition. My results require that the sign
here is strictly positive. This implies that −xg′′(x)
g′(x) < 1, which is mathematically
equivalent to the coefficient of relative risk aversion being less than one. Note that
this requirement, that g′ (x) + xg′′ (x) > 0, is true for a broad class of concave
functions, such as g(x) = xβ where β ∈ (0, 1).
Intuitively, an increase in fragmentation has two effects: each party now receives
a smaller share of the pie (which will increase the marginal utility of targeted public
goods), but also that targeted public goods have become more expensive (as each ad-












determines which effect dominates. If positive, then the latter effect dominates.
To proceed, I assume that g′ (x) + xg′′ (x) > 0. Under this assumption we may
conclude that Equation (2.8) is negative: an increase in n will lower taxes. Similar
conclusions can be drawn about Equation (2.9).
Comparative statics are more complex for the multivariate optimization problem.
This requires us to account for cross-partial effects of τ on α, etc. Firstly, given that
both of the first-order conditions (F1) and (F2) will equal zero in equilibrium, we























With these derivatives, we have a system of equations that implicitly define how
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We can apply Cramer’s Rule to Equation (2.11) to derive our comparative statics




, we see how taxes and transfer intensity respond to
an increase in n. The first key comparative static is ∂τ
∂n
, how the tax rate responds
to a change in fragmentation. A positive coefficient would indicate that taxes go up
when the number of parties increases.
Proposition 5. Fragmentation leads to lower taxes.

































































































































































is thus equal to Equation (2.15) minus Equation (2.18).




























The denominator of this comparative static is also the difference of two products.






































(1− α)2 [f ′′ (.)]2 + ( 1
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When including the numerator from Equation (2.19) and the denominator from





























































We conclude that fragmentation lowers tax rates.
Corollary 1. Fragmentation leads to lower expenditure.
Proof. Equation (2.27) shows that tax rates fall as fragmentation increases. By
budget balancing, this implies that expenditure also falls.
Our second key comparative static is
∂α
∂n
, how the proportion of resources for the
targeted local public good respond to a change in fragmentation. The sign of the
comparative static indicates whether more or less ‘pork’ occurs with more parties.
Proposition 6 shows that the relationship is negative.
Proposition 6. Fragmentation leads to lower transfer intensity.























Note that the denominator here is equal to the denominator in Proposition 5. The














. For the first






















and from Equation (2.5) that
∂F1
∂τ










































































































































(1− α)2f ′′ (.)− (α
n
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(1− α)f ′′ (.)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
 (2.36)
Recall that the denominator here is equal to the denominator in Proposition 5, i.e.




































Corollary 2. Fragmentation lowers the level of transfers.
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Proof. By Equation (2.38), the fraction of revenue going to transfers falls when
fragmentation increases. By Corollary 1, the levels of expenditure falls. Combined,
these imply that the level of transfers falls.
2.2.1 Summary of Implications
The model presented is an n-member common pool problem. The coalition si-
multaneously choose the tax rate τ , and the fraction α of tax revenue directed to
local public goods/transfers. Politically motivated goods are over-produced, and the
government chooses tax rates that are inefficiently high. In this regard, the model
matches the existing literature.
The focus of the model is how these results depend on the level of fragmentation,
labeled n. The analysis predicts that taxes fall as n increases. This also implies that
spending falls when n increases. The comparative statics also predicted that transfers
fall when n increases. These are the main predictions of the model, and they do not
coincide with the conventional wisdom. I test these predictions in Section 2.3.2.
The theory provides a stronger testable implication than those listed above. It
is clear that both transfers and spending should decrease as n increases. However,
α is defined as transfers as a fraction of government revenue, not just transfers as
a fraction of GDP. I refer to α as “transfer intensity”. The model predicts that α,
transfer intensity, should fall as n increases.
A further implication of the model is nonlinearity in the marginal effects. As
both τ and α are fractions bounded by [0, 1] we do not expect a constant effect of
a change in n. In particular, a marginal change in n at low levels (e.g. from two to
three parties) is expected to have a larger effect than a change at high levels (e.g.




The predictions of Section 2 can be tested empirically. The data (Armingeon
et al., 2012a) are from the Institute of Political Science at the University of Bern.
This includes measures of political competition as well as primary macroeconomic
variables such as government revenue and social security transfers for 23 countries1
from 1975–2010.2 We see that nations with more parties have larger government
sectors.
1Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland,
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, UK, and USA.
2The data extend back to 1960 but are less reliable pre-1975. For example, in some specifications
I include national debt as a control variable. Prior to 1975, more than half (60%) of values for debt
are missing, whereas 8% are missing for post-1975. For legislative fragmentation, 11% of the values
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Average Spending and Number of Parties
Figure 2.1: The conventional wisdom on spending
Measuring the number of political parties in a country is a non-trivial exercise.
Although there are over 400 parties registered in the United Kingdom, three dominate
parliament. Similarly, the United States is considered a two-party system, despite
the existence of Libertarians, Greens, etc. To accounts for this, Lijphart (1984) uses
the ‘effective number of parties’, taking weighted averages of parties’ importance in
elections and parliament. The computation is comparable to the Herfindahl concen-
tration index. In a legislature with m parties, and where si denotes the vote share
for party i,






Over the period 1975–2010 there is a reasonable amount of variation in the measure
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of legislative fragmentation. For example, Germany has a mean value of 3.38 and a
standard deviation of 0.49, while Italy’s mean and standard deviation are 4.64 and
1.31 respectively. The median value for all countries is 3.2 with a standard deviation
of 1.4. The US has particularly low values: the mean is 1.95 with a standard deviation
of 0.06.
Table 2.1: Summary statistics for 23 countries, 1975–2010
Mean Std. Dev N Min Max
Gov’t receipts (% GDP) 42.56 8.40 785 24.35 63.20
Gov’t expenditure (% GDP) 45.14 8.18 785 26.07 70.54
Gov’t transfers (% GDP) 13.68 3.88 820 4.34 23.89
Eff. parties parliament 3.59 1.43 826 1.69 9.07
Transfers (% Gov’t receipts) 31.94 7.33 783 11.89 55.41
Unemployment benefits (% Gov’t receipts) 3.06 2.15 636 0.00 11.56
Old age benefits (% Gov’t receipts) 16.28 6.01 639 4.82 35.42
Active labor market programs (% Gov’t receipts) 1.54 0.89 566 0.00 4.72
Recall that the main predictions of the model were that taxes, spending, and
transfers fall as the number of coalition partners rise. For the purposes of the empir-
ical analysis, my measures are total tax receipts as a percent of GDP, total outlays of
government as a percent of GDP, and social security transfers as a percent of GDP.
Summary statistics are provided in Table 1.
In addition, the theory makes a sharper prediction: that transfers as a fraction of
government revenue falls when fragmentation increases. This fraction, labeled α, has
several empirical analogs. The data permit testing this prediction with four variants
of economic transfers: all social security transfers, unemployment benefits, old age
benefits, and expenditure on active labor market programs. Unemployment benefits
and active labor market programs are clearly expenditure targeted at specific groups
more vulnerable to labor market fluctuations; and old age benefits are not pure public
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goods.
I primarily measure political competition by the effective number of parties in
parliament. Therefore the empirical results in Section 2.3.2 measure the impact
of legislative fragmentation on tax policy. I find that legislative fragmentation is
indeed correlated with tax policy. As we will soon see, I find that its impact is of
the opposing sign and is statistically different from the conventional approach.
Legislative fragmentation, of course, is distinct from executive/government frag-
mentation. For example, fragmentation that is restricted exclusively to opposition
parties may not correspond to increased executive fragmentation. Some previous
work (cf. Kontopoulos and Perotti (1999)) emphasize the importance of this dis-
tinction. Therefore in Section 2.3.4 I will largely repeat the analysis of legislative
fragmentation but instead use measures of executive fragmentation.
2.3.2 Legislative Fragmentation
The empirical analysis is based on a country fixed effect model:
yit = ai + δt + βxit + it
where yit is the outcome (e.g. tax receipts as a fraction of GDP) in country i during
year t; the ai variables are country fixed effects; δt represents year fixed effects; xit
are country-year covariates (such as legislative fragmentation); and it is the error
term. The standard condition for parameter identification,
E [it|xit, ai, δt] = 0
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holds when the change in level of fragmentation is exogenous conditional on fixed
effects.
The fixed effects model exploits within country variation, rather than between
country variation, to derive results. The estimation is thus based on changes in
the number of parties within a country. This approach captures all time-invariant,
country-specific heterogeneity, and isolates that effect from any (time-invariant) spu-
rious relationships between countries’ number of parties and public finances. Esti-
mation with country fixed effects therefore entirely nests many other approaches.
For example, the differences due to ethnolinguistic fractionalization as calculated by
Alesina et al. (2003), are embedded into country fixed effects.
Identification is not compromised by disgruntled electorates changing party alle-
giances, e.g. switching from Democrats to Republicans. Identification requires that,
conditional on observable characteristics, the level of fragmentation is exogenous.
This is a much more reasonable claim. Moreover, cleanly identified evidence of these
results have been found by Pettersson-Lidbom (2012). This alleviates concerns that
these results are not causal.
Of course any time-varying heterogeneity could also bias the estimator. This is
less likely to be a problem with shorter time-horizons and wider cross-sections. For
this reason, I repeat the procedure on a wider sample of 35 countries, including those
previously behind the Iron Curtain, which is available for the year 1990–2010. These
results are in Section 2.3.5.
Table 2 presents the main empirical contribution of the paper. It shows the re-
sults, with and without country fixed effects, of regressing tax policy on legislative
fragmentation. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correla-
tion, and are consistent even under cross-sectional dependence (Driscoll and Kraay,






. This equals 3 for my time horizon. The results are not sensitive
to longer lengths. For example, increasing the lag length from 3 to 10 changes the
standard error in Column 2 from 0.3187 to 0.3369. This decreases the t-stat from
3.28 to 3.10.
Table 2.2: Decline in taxes, spending, and transfers
Receipts Expenditure Transfers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Eff. parties parliament 2.309∗∗∗ -1.045∗∗∗ 1.894∗∗∗ -1.939∗∗∗ 0.615∗∗∗ -0.697∗∗∗
(0.198) (0.319) (0.178) (0.430) (0.0816) (0.156)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 783 783 783 783 818 818
Driscoll-Kraay standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Let us first look at the results on tax revenue presented in Columns 1 and 2.
Column 1 presents the ‘conventional wisdom’ estimates, based on between-country
regressions. My preferred specification, including country fixed effects, is shown in
Column 2.
The first column presents evidence supporting Lijphart (1984)’s conclusion that
more parties leads to higher tax receipts. These results are positive and significant at
the 1% level. Column 1 suggests that if the UK moved from a three- to a four-party
system, the fraction of output collected by the government would increase by about
2.3 percentage points.
Column 2, which has the potential to nest Column 1 but isolates any fundamental
country heterogeneity, shows a negative coefficient. This suggests that moving from
a three- to four-party system would lower tax revenue by about one percentage point.
This result is also highly significant. Crucially, however, it is of different sign. The
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different approaches in Columns 1 and 2 reaches opposite conclusions. As predicted
by the group maximization problem in Section 2, increased legislative fragmentation
is associated with lower tax receipts.
Next we look at government expenditure. The columns have the same interpreta-
tion as before. Our coefficients again change sign: Column 3 suggests increasing the
number of parties by one will increase government expenditure by about 2 percent-
age points; Column 4 suggests it would decrease expenditure by a similar amount.
Again, the results are of opposing sign, and counter to the conventional wisdom. As
predicted by the model, we find lower spending with more fragmentation.
What of transfers? The pattern emerges again. The between country estimator
finds a positive effect, the within country estimator a negative effect, and the differ-
ence is significant. The between estimate suggests an increase in fragmentation leads
to a 0.6 percentage point increase in social security transfers as a fraction of GDP.
The within estimate suggests the same increase in fragmentation would reduce social
security transfers by 0.7 percentage points.
Are these results ‘real’ or, for example, driven by outliers? One method to check
for a robust relationship is to take a nonparametric approach to the data. As sug-
gested by Chetty et al. (2014), we can visualize the conditional expectation functions
using binned scatterplots. This approach is comparable to a scatter plot, but takes
the y-axis average of the points within equal-sized x-axis bins. Binned scatterplots
also allow for the inclusion of control variables, which can change regression slopes
and intercepts and shift the relative position of visualized data points. Thus includ-
ing control variables (such as fixed effects) will change the location of the points on

























Effective number of parties
Figure 2.2: Nonparametric binned scatterplots show reversal of relationship
This nonparametric approach provides visual evidence that receipts fall as the
number of parties increases. Almost identical plots can be produced for expenditure
and transfers.
To see if the results are confounded by serial correlation, Figure 2.3 shows scatter
bins in first differences i.e. ∆Yit = β∆Xit + ∆it. Results are no longer significant
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Figure 2.3: Binned scatterplots show negative relationship in first differences.
The model makes a further, stronger prediction. Not just is it expected that
transfers fall but that transfers as a fraction of government revenue falls. I call this
“transfer intensity”. The prediction that transfer intensity falls is tested in Table 3.
This time, both between and within estimates suggest a negative sign. Again, the
prediction is validated by the fixed effects estimates, and the result is significant at
the 1% confidence level.
Table 2.3: Effects on social transfers as % of government revenue
Transfers Intensity
(1) (2)
Eff. parties parliament -0.278 -0.892∗∗∗
(0.216) (0.275)
Year FE Yes Yes
Country FE No Yes
N 781 781
In addition to measuring α with all social security transfers, I confirm that the
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prediction holds also for sub-components of transfers. In particular, the data permit
testing this prediction with unemployment benefits, old age benefits, and expenditure
on active labor market programs. The results are in Table 4.
Table 2.4: Effects on Various Social Transfers
Unemployment Old Age Benefits ALMPs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Eff. parties parliament 0.484∗∗∗ -0.223∗∗ 0.210 -1.035∗∗∗ 0.208∗∗∗ -0.138∗∗∗
(0.0576) (0.0841) (0.208) (0.229) (0.0287) (0.0340)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 636 636 639 639 566 566
Again the results support the theory. Targeted transfers fall significantly when
legislatures become more fractured. These holds true not just for social security
transfers in total, but for each of the components in Table 4. These hypothesis
provide a sharp test of the model from Section 2, and the results are unambiguous.
For unemployment insurance, the coefficient implies an increase in the number of
parties lowers the fraction of tax revenue directed to the unemployed falls for 0.2%.
The corresponding numbers for pensions and labor market participation programs
are 1% and 0.1% respectively.
Taken as a whole, the results reject the conventional wisdom. More fragmented
parliaments are not associated with higher taxes, spending, and transfers. The op-
posite is true. As parliaments become more fragmented, the size of the public sector
falls. This is true whether we look to total receipts, total expenditure, transfers as a
whole, or differing components of transfers.
Are these results cleanly identified? Probably not. In any broad international
analysis of public finances over a generation, it is unlikely that we can find clean ex-
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clusion restrictions. These results would be more convincing with quasi-experimental
evidence.
Such evidence already exists. Pettersson-Lidbom (2012) provides evidence chal-
lenging the conventional wisdom. In the context of two natural experiments in Scan-
dinavia, Pettersson-Lidbom (2012) finds than an increase in legislature size lowers
the size of government. Given that the results are driven exclusively by two Nordic
countries, it is reasonable to question the external validity of those results. This
paper shows that the effects are true more generally. The results hold for a broad
selection of OECD countries over the past forty years.
This should lead us to reevaluate our model of policy formation. The data sup-
port the model of Section 2 which, unlike other models in the literature, places few
restrictions on the optimizing behavior of coalition partners.
2.3.3 Why such a different relationship?
The result that the inclusion of fixed effects reverses the sign of the relationship
presents a puzzle. Why is there such a different relationship? I outline a model below
which presents one possible mechanism.
Let country i be endowed, through nature and/or historical process, with a pa-
rameter θi. This parameter captures the extent of political disagreement within a
country. Specifically, the preferences of citizens are evenly distributed over the in-
terval [0, θi]. In words, the larger a country’s θ, the wider the spectrum of political
views its citizens hold. France, for example, has prominent socialist as well as far-
right parties. In contrast, the political landscape in the United States is constrained
between center-right and conservative parties. Thus France’s political spectrum is
wider than the United States’, and therefore θFR > θUS. Graphically, consider the
following country with a relatively small θ. For illustrative purposes, I divide the
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political space into n = 2 evenly sized segments, each representing a political party.







Figure 2.4: A country of type θ1, with two parties
Consider alternatively a country of type θ2 > θ1. Here the spectrum of political
beliefs is larger. Again, as an illustration, I divide the political space into evenly
sized segments. However, there are more political parties in this country. This is
because political beliefs are more dispersed. This seems intuitively reasonable, as
a larger political spectrum leaves more ‘room’ for alternative parties. This country
has seven parties. A government would require the support of at least θ2/2 of the

















Figure 2.5: A country of type θ2, with seven parties
Now consider the case where θ is positively correlated with preferences over the tax
rate τ . That is, an increase in the spectrum of political views is more likely to
facilitate economically liberal agendas than economically conservative ones. Then
countries with higher values of θ will tend to have higher tax rates.
When coupled with the the number of parties increasing in the size of the political
spectrum, a positive correlation between θ and τ is sufficient to obtain the conven-
tional wisdom. Countries endowed with a wider range of views have more parties,
and these parties are likely to support larger government sectors. If one were to
regress taxes, spending, and/or transfers on the number of parties in a country, we
would expect to find a positive relationship. Fragmentation appears to inflate the
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size of government. That is precisely the conventional wisdom that has prevailed for
decades.
This paper asks a slightly more nuanced question: when conditioning on country-
specific political factors, what then is the effect of fragmentation? That question can
be addressed by including country fixed effects. Controlling for all time-invariant,
country-specific factors isolates the impact of fragmentation from the effects of a
country’s θ parameter. As discussed above, fixed effects capture many likely candi-
dates for the causes of differing values of θ, such as ethnolinguistic fractionalization
or the particulars of a country’s constitutional history.
We have seen in Table 2 that including country fixed effects suggests a negative
relationship between fragmentation and taxes. What is the mechanism driving this
result? The intuition is subtle. Consider the same country as described by Figure
2.5. The value θ2 remains unchanged and without loss of generality suppose parties
1 through 4 are in a coalition government. Now suppose that the second party



















Figure 2.6: A country of type θ2, now with more fragmentation
The segment previously occupied by Party 2 is now divided between 2A and 2B.
It is instructive to note that the split was independent of this country’s θ and that the
extent of fragmentation has exogenously increased. The coalition now reevaluates
its policy choices. Recall from Section 2 that the government chooses tax rates τ ,
global public good G1, and targeted public good (“pork”) G2. All parties benefit
from lower taxes, and the marginal benefit of lower taxes has remained constant.
Conversely, recall that G2 is divided among coalition partners. With an increase in
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fragmentation, an extra dollar in G2 is distributed among more people, leaving less
for each individual member. Consequently the parties desire a shifting of resources
away from spending on G2 towards lower taxes. Revenue falls, as does expenditure,
as does transfer intensity.
The model above provides one plausible explanation what may be driving the
results from Section 2.3.2 that suggest that an increase in fragmentation leads to a
smaller public sector.. To examine whether these results are robust, the next sections
repeat the empirical investigation of Section 2.3.2 with some modifications. Firstly
I confirm the main results hold for executive fragmentation as well as legislative
fragmentation. Secondly I test the results with a different, wider panel of OECD
countries, including the new post-Soviet democracies. Thirdly I use alternative em-
pirical measures of taxation and political fragmentation. Fourthly I show the results
do not depend on the ideological composition of government. Fifthly I show the
results are robust to the inclusion of macroeconomic controls. Finally I test if the
results are robust to the phase of the electoral cycle.
2.3.4 Executive Fragmentation
The preceding section analyzed the effects of legislative fragmentation on tax pol-
icy. It is debateable whether the legislative branch is the appropriate object of study
here. Arguably it is the executive branch which warrants closest inspection. Indeed
the actors of the model in Section 2 are assumed to be in a government coalition.
This section thus repeats the empirical tests above for executive fragmentation. In
short, I demonstrate that the results hold for executive fragmentation as well as
legislative fragmentation.
The data include details on the type of government in country i at time t. These
are coded on a 1-7 scale by the political scientists leading the project. The summary
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Table 2.5: Type of Government
Freq. Percent Cum. Percent
Single party government 201 25.74 25.74
Minimal winning coalition 254 32.52 58.26
Surplus coalition 160 20.49 78.75
Single party minority 96 12.29 91.04
Multi party minority 65 8.32 99.36
Caretaker government 5 0.64 100.00
Total 781 100.00
Fragmentation of government, on a 1-7 scale
statistics are included in Table 5. As we can see, there is considerable variation in
the extent of executive fragmentation. For instance, minority governments have been
in power for more a fifth of country-years in the OECD since 1975. Not surprisingly,
this measure is positively correlated with legislative fragmentation.
Table 6 is the executive fragmentation analogue of Table 2. Instead of regressing
policy outcomes on legislative fragmentation, Table 6 shows the results for executive
fragmentation.
Table 2.6: Decline in taxes, spending, and transfers: executive (long)
Receipts Expenditure Transfers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Executive Fragmentation 2.523∗∗∗ -0.438∗∗∗ 1.844∗∗∗ -0.396 0.633∗∗∗ -0.0462
(0.352) (0.150) (0.395) (0.265) (0.211) (0.0714)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 723 723 723 723 753 753
The same pattern emerges. All within-country estimates demonstrate negative
coefficients, albeit without significance for expenditure and transfers. However the
results are of the opposing sign, and statistically different from, the effects predicted
by the conventional wisdom.
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2.3.5 More countries, shorter panel
A problem with analysis of the large-T panel data in Sections 2.3.2 and 2.3.4 is
that the possibility of non-parallel trends increases in T , and this threatens identifi-
cation. Consequently I repeat the analysis on a larger panel that includes post-Soviet
countries. Obviously this requires shortening the time horizon. The data (Armingeon
et al., 2012b) again come from the Institute of Political Science at the University of
Bern. They include measures of political competition as well as primary macroeco-
nomic variables such as government revenue for 35 countries3 since 1990. Table 7
summarizes the data, and Table 8 presents the main regression results.
Table 2.7: Summary statistics for 35 countries, 1990–2010
Mean Std. Dev N Min Max
Gov’t receipts (% GDP) 41.90 7.36 719 24.30 63.13
Gov’t expenditure (% GDP) 44.41 7.35 719 24.70 70.54
Soc sec transfers (% GDP) 13.42 3.45 728 5.55 23.66
Eff. parties parliament 3.81 1.46 762 1.74 10.92
Transfers (% Gov’t receipts) 31.98 6.19 713 11.89 49.95
Transfers (% Gov’t expenditure) 29.97 4.82 713 10.53 39.96
The results here are again fully supportive of the theory, just like the original
results found of Section 2.3.2. It is useful to recall the results from Table 2. The
coefficients found for the effect of fragmentation on receipts, outlays, and transfers
were -1.045, -1.939, -0.697 respectively. The analogous coefficients here are -0.464,
-0.732, and -0.204. The results in the longer sample are of the same sign and order
of magnitude of the results in the original sample. Although slightly closer to zero,
the coefficients remain significant at conventional levels. I interpret these results as
3Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia,
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, and USA.
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Table 2.8: Decline in taxes, spending, and transfers
Receipts Expenditure Transfers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Eff. parties parliament 1.456∗∗∗ -0.464∗∗∗ 0.903∗∗∗ -0.732∗∗ 0.331∗∗∗ -0.204∗∗
(0.104) (0.133) (0.162) (0.325) (0.0911) (0.0963)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 716 716 716 716 725 725
support for the model and the conclusion of Section 2.3.2
Further evidence can be seen in Table 9, the effects of legislative fragmentation
on transfer intensity α. Although neither coefficient are found to be significant
(p < 0.14), the sign confirms the negative relationship.
Table 2.9: Effects on α
Transfers Intensity
(1) (2)
Eff. parties parliament -0.348 -0.491
(0.228) (0.315)
Year FE Yes Yes
Country FE No Yes
N 710 710
2.3.6 Different measure of taxation
The second robustness check is to use an alternative measure of taxation. Section
2.3.2 relied on total tax receipts as a fraction of GDP. This could be affected by issues
such as windfall receipts from natural resource discoveries. Therefore in the spirit
of Mendoza, Razin and Tesar (1994), I test the model with a more micro-founded
measure of income tax. As we can see from Figure 2.7, these tax rate data map
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Figure 2.7: Relationship with alternative measure of taxation
These additional tax rate data come from Peter, Buttrick and Duncan (2010).
This dataset emphasizes the actual tax rates paid by individuals at specified income
levels (average wage, twice the average wage, etc.) rather than focusing on total
receipts of the state. The main variable employed is the tax rate for the mean income
level after adjusting for allowances, credits, local taxes, etc. This years included are
1982 through 2005.
Again there is a pattern of coefficients changing sign. The result on 4x average
income, the coefficient of which is positive, seems to reject a theme of my model.
However, the model does not make predictions about the progressivity of the tax
schedule. The model is about overall tax rates, and is silent on taxes on higher
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Table 2.10: Alternative Tax Measure
Average Income Avg Income x2 Avg Income x4
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Eff. parties 0.921∗∗∗ -0.253 1.097∗∗∗ -0.210 0.988∗∗∗ 0.461
(0.199) (0.349) (0.168) (0.391) (0.254) (0.357)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 493 493 493 493 493 493
incomes. Consequently the most useful comparison then is the difference between
Column 1 and Column 2, which measures taxes paid at average income levels. The
results here are consistent with the model. The results with fixed effects are not
statistically significant. This is perhaps not surprising as the inclusion of fixed effects
reduces the number of degrees of freedom by 35. Although they are not significant,
they are negative. Furthermore, they are significantly different from the positive
coefficients predicted by excluding fixed effects.
2.3.7 Different measure of fragmentation
An alternative measure of legislative fragmentation that is closely correlated (but
not identical) to the effective number of parties, was proposed by Rae (1968). This
is a nonlinear transformation of the effective number of parties. If we define the
effective number of parties as e, then the Rae measure equals
1
1− e . Table 11 shows
the regression output. It would be concerning if this transformation substantially
changed the interpretation of my results.
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Table 2.11: Alternative Fragmentation Measure
Receipts Outlays Transfers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Rae Measure 0.357∗∗∗ -0.154∗∗∗ 0.265∗∗∗ -0.250∗∗∗ 0.0881∗∗∗ -0.0613∗∗∗
(0.0174) (0.0258) (0.0204) (0.0431) (0.0111) (0.0183)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 783 783 783 783 818 818
2.3.8 Ideological composition
Table 13 shows the effects of including controls for political ideologies. To ensure
robustness, I measure political ideology at both the executive and legislative level.
At the executive level, I include the fraction of cabinet posts held by people of
differing political persuasions. At the legislative level, I control for the fraction of
the parliament seats won by a country’s major socialist, conservative, liberal, and
religious parties. Summary statistics are provided in Table 12.
Table 2.12: Summary statistics for ideological variables
Mean Std. Dev N Min Max
Right-wing gov’t (%) 38.26 38.58 825 0.00 100.00
Centrist gov’t (%) 23.92 30.30 825 0.00 100.00
Left-wing gov’t (%) 34.79 37.89 825 0.00 100.00
Socialist par’t (%) 28.36 17.19 826 0.00 63.60
Conservative par’t (%) 17.20 20.25 826 0.00 74.80
Liberal par’t (%) 12.55 17.75 826 0.00 67.10
Religious par’t (%) 9.38 13.95 826 0.00 44.30
The odd-numbered columns in Table 13 investigates the effect of ideological di-
visions on the executive dimension. The even-number columns include controls for
the legislative dimension. We can see that for the most part neither the executive
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nor legislative controls are statistically or economically significant. Moreover, they
do not substantially alter the coefficients on the effective number of parties. The
results that fragmentation lowers taxes, spending, and transfers remains robust.
Table 2.13: Effects of Ideological Composition
Receipts Outlays Transfers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Eff. parties -1.149∗∗∗ -1.097∗∗∗ -2.183∗∗∗ -1.899∗∗∗ -0.796∗∗∗ -0.719∗∗∗
(0.304) (0.337) (0.397) (0.445) (0.175) (0.185)
Right-wing gov’t (%) -0.0303 -0.0742∗∗ -0.0259
(0.0286) (0.0354) (0.0154)
Centrist gov’t (%) -0.0331 -0.0736∗∗ -0.0327∗∗
(0.0264) (0.0312) (0.0132)
Left-wing gov’t (%) -0.0262 -0.0631∗ -0.0298∗
(0.0279) (0.0363) (0.0151)
Socialist par’t (%) 0.0357∗ 0.0234 0.00619
(0.0200) (0.0340) (0.0171)
Conservative par’t (%) 0.0157 0.0177 0.0101
(0.0174) (0.0231) (0.0132)
Liberal par’t (%) 0.0543∗∗ 0.0221 0.00811
(0.0253) (0.0376) (0.0177)
Religious par’t (%) -0.116∗∗∗ -0.0206 -0.0303∗
(0.0381) (0.0522) (0.0169)
Year & Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 783 783 783 783 817 818
2.3.9 Macroeconomic controls
Perhaps the changes in tax policy are responses not to fragmentation, but to
macroeconomic shocks. There as a further robustness check, I control for some
macroeconomic variables. The variables included are summarized in Table 14.
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Table 2.14: Summary statistics for 23 countries, 1975–2010
Mean Std. Dev N Min Max
Gov’t receipts (% GDP) 42.56 8.40 785 24.35 63.20
Gov’t expenditure (% GDP) 45.14 8.18 785 26.07 70.54
Social security transfers (% GDP) 13.68 3.88 820 4.34 23.89
Eff. parties 3.59 1.43 826 1.69 9.07
International Trade (% GDP) 72.48 44.99 828 16.01 319.55
Population over 65 (millions) 4.87 7.51 818 0.02 40.54
National Debt (% GDP) 61.22 30.77 755 4.64 192.74
The inclusion of macro controls are potentially endogenous. Consequently I in-
tentionally chose control variables that are at least partly outside the control of
government: openness to international trade, population over 65, and national debt.
International trade is well explained by the geographical size of a country and prox-
imity to its neighbors; modern democracies have limited control on the size of its
adult population; and national debt is a a stock variable that a government may
have difficulty substantially affecting. Although these controls are likely less endoge-
nous than variables such as deficit level or inflation rate, they should be interpreted
carefully. Regression results with and without macro controls are included in Table
15.
Table 2.15: Effect of Macro Controls
Receipts Expenditure Transfers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Eff. parties -1.045∗∗∗ -0.667∗∗∗ -1.939∗∗∗ -1.277∗∗∗ -0.697∗∗∗ -0.334∗∗
(0.319) (0.202) (0.430) (0.236) (0.156) (0.124)
Year & Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Macro Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 783 742 783 742 818 742
Macroeconomic factors do catch some of the residual variance and consequently
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influence our coefficients of interest. In general, the magnitudes drop by about half.
The substantive results — and the sign of the relationship — remain the same.
2.3.10 Electoral cycle
The results are also robust to phases of the electoral cycle. Table 17, which is
large and thus left to the appendix, illustrates this. I include controls for year before,
year of, and year after election. These results are generally negative but insignificant.
They are somewhat significant on receipts: taxes do indeed go down in an election
year. In no specification do the electoral cycle variables meaningfully alter the main
parameters of interest.
2.3.11 Heterogeneous treatments
As mentioned in Section 2.1, the model predicts nonlinearity in the marginal
effects of n on tax policy. Both the tax rate τ and the fraction of revenue dedicated
to transfers α are bounded by [0, 1], so all OLS-like estimates such as those above
provide linear approximations of the effect. As the outcome is bounded, these effects
cannot hold over the complete range of the X variable. In particular, the model
predicts that a change in n at low levels will have a larger effect than a change in n
at high levels. We expect that results are stronger for smaller values of n. To test
this theory, I split the sample into above- and below-median values of the effective
number of parties.
We can see for receipts and outlays that the effect is about three times larger
for the below-median values of n than the above-median values. Interestingly, the
results appear approximately constant for transfers. I conclude that there is strong
evidence of nonlinearity in effects on receipts and outlays, but no such evidence for
transfers.
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Table 2.16: Decline in taxes, spending, and transfers: heterogeneous treatments
Receipts Expenditure Transfers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Eff. parties -2.584∗∗∗ -0.742∗∗ -4.053∗∗∗ -1.681∗∗∗ -0.688∗ -0.726∗∗∗
(0.760) (0.333) (1.004) (0.399) (0.400) (0.161)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Above Median No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 396 387 396 387 406 412
2.4 Conclusion
This paper asks how political fragmentation affects fiscal policy outcomes. I
modeled this as a common pool problem where a coalition of n members chooses
tax and expenditure policies. Unlike other models which constrain the coalition’s
actions through norms, the coalition’s choice essentially corresponds to a group wel-
fare maximization problem. The coalition can fund two types of good: the pure
public good which is shared by all, and the local public good which is targeted to
political constituencies. The model shows that governments fund targeted public
goods above the level a benevolent social planner would choose, and consequently
that governments set tax rates that are inefficiently high. These results are standard
in the literature.
Next the paper showed how these results respond to a change in n. Comparative
static analysis indicates that taxes, spending, transfers, and transfer intensity fall
as the coalition becomes more fragmented. Fragmentation reduces the inefficiency.
These results are not standard. Over the decades, the theoretical and empirical lit-
eratures on the question have generated a consensus (“conventional wisdom”) that
fragmentation leads to a larger public sector. My results run counter to the conven-
tional wisdom.
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I test these results with data from dozens of OECD countries over the past forty
years. I replicate the conventional wisdom using a naive estimation procedure. An
improved specification which includes country fixed effects has results that are wholly
different from the conventional wisdom. Rather than a positive relationship between
fragmentation and the size of government, the relationship is negative. This holds
true for receipts, expenditures, transfers, the fraction of government revenue assigned
to transfers, and various forms of transfers. This results also hold true for legislative
as well as executive fragmentation. The results are not affected by the ideological
composition of government or parliament, or the phase of the electoral cycle.
The contributions of this paper are twofold. Firstly, it supports the empiri-
cal result of Pettersson-Lidbom (2012) with greater external validity than quasi-
experimental settings can provide. The selection of data from a panel of developed
nations lends the empirical section to a battery of robustness tests. The results are
robust to different specifications, measures of executive fragmentation, alternative
data sources, ideological controls, and electoral cycle effects. Secondly, the paper
provides an intuitive theoretical foundation that motivate these results. The conven-
tional wisdom in the literature is that more fragmented governments lead to larger
public sectors. Both the theoretical and empirical sections suggest that the conven-
tional wisdom is incorrect. The model in Section 2 could be extended to incorporate
more nuance in the effect of fragmentation on legislative bargaining. This is an
avenue for future work.
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Appendix: Tax Policy and the Electoral Cycle
Table 2.17: Effects of Electoral Cycle on Receipts, Outlays, and Transfers
Receipts Outlays Transfers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Eff. parties -1.045∗∗∗ -1.038∗∗∗ -1.006∗∗∗ -1.103∗∗∗ -1.939∗∗∗ -1.943∗∗∗ -1.946∗∗∗ -2.111∗∗∗ -0.697∗∗∗ -0.699∗∗∗ -0.661∗∗∗ -0.730∗∗∗
(0.319) (0.319) (0.336) (0.314) (0.430) (0.432) (0.458) (0.430) (0.156) (0.159) (0.158) (0.144)
Election Year -0.160 -0.0943 0.00554 0.0926 0.199 0.590 0.0662 0.126 0.309∗
(0.160) (0.245) (0.343) (0.239) (0.331) (0.456) (0.107) (0.134) (0.182)
Pre-election Year 0.0180 0.103 0.0496 0.376 0.0537 0.183
(0.237) (0.298) (0.266) (0.330) (0.0998) (0.124)
Post-election Year 0.0463 0.543 0.243∗
(0.267) (0.365) (0.142)
Year & Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 783 783 760 742 783 783 760 742 818 818 797 775
Driscoll-Kraay standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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CHAPTER III
Crime and the Labour Market in Ireland,
2003–2014
3.1 Introduction
This paper provides a detailed statistical analysis of relationship between crime
and the labour market in Ireland during and after the Celtic Tiger. How does the
number of burglaries in an area change as the number of people on the unemployment
register1 increases? I find that there is a robust and significant increase. I estimate a
property crime elasticity of about 0.5. This means that a 10% rise in the number of
people on the unemployment register in a county increases the number of property
crimes in that county by 5%.
The data cover crimes reported from every police station in Ireland, and the
conclusions are similar for both theft (estimated elasticity of 0.57) and burglary
(0.49). As predicted by economic theory, the association with assault is much smaller:
I estimate an assault elasticity of 0.06. Sex offences are also strongly correlated
1The ‘Live Register’ is an administrative count of the number of people registered for unemploy-
ment assistance. It measures how many people are receiving benefits while seeking employment,
not unemployment per se. For this reason this subject of this paper is crime and the labour market,
not crime and unemployment.
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with increasing unemployment and underemployment. The finding that the labour
market can determine domestic violence and/or sexual assault has been documented
previously, cf. Aizer (2010) and Edmark (2005).
The time-frame in question, 2003–2014, is a unique chapter in Irish history. The
first half captures the Celtic Tiger, a period of exceptional economic growth and
prosperity. During this time, the government ran large surpluses, and hundreds of
thousands of people from the newly enlarged EU migrated to Ireland. The construc-
tion sector grew by more than 10% per annum, and property prices soared.
The latter half includes the financial crisis and subsequent dramatic collapse of the
Irish economy. The construction industry contracted by three-quarters. In just over
three years, the unemployment rate rose from 4.5% to 14%. Ultimately, the Irish
government required financial assistance from the European Union and the IMF.
Such a huge contrast in fortune is essentially unprecedented in a developed economy.
The period is thus not only an important chapter for Ireland, but a fascinating time
in economic history more generally. The primary research question of this paper is
how property crime responded.
The study of criminal behaviour as a consequence of the economic environment is
not new. It came to the fore in economics with Becker (1968). Becker’s contribution
was seminal for subsequent empirical work. This literature is now vast. Analyses
have been conducted in many contexts. For example, see Raphael and Winter-Ebmer
(2001) and Levitt (1996, 1997) on the United States; Machin and Meghir (2004) on
England and Wales; de Blasio and Menon (2013) on Italy; Carneiro et al. (2016)
on Brazil; Dube and Vargas (2013) on Colombia; Fouge´re et al. (2009) on France;
Flu¨ckiger and Ludwig (2015) for how fishing conditions affect maritime piracy; and
Aslund et al. (2015) and Anderson (2014) for the effect of schooling laws on youth
crime.
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To my knowledge the most comparable analysis from Ireland is Denny, Harmon
and Lydon (2004), over which this paper has at least three advantages. Firstly, the
large changes in the labour market pre- and post-2008 provide near-ideal variation
for estimation within a short horizon. Secondly, using local-level crime statistics, this
paper can estimate relationships using within-county variation. This is advantageous
because it eliminates many concerns about the crime-labour market relationship
varying between differing geographic regions. Finally, rather than being restricted
to data on burglary alone, the dataset used in this paper includes several classes of
crime such as theft and assault.
Section 2 provides an overview of the data used in the analysis, while Sections 3
and 4 provide a variety of OLS-based estimates of the relationship. Due to concerns of
omitted variable bias, the literature has generally not relied on OLS-based estimates
alone. Consequently in Section 5 I present instrumental variables estimates that
are based on the region-sector instrument proposed by Bartik (1991). Section 6
concludes.
3.2 Data Overview
The crime data used in this paper are the reported crime statistics provided by
An Garda S´ıocha´na to the Central Statistics Office (CSO). The Garda PULSE sys-
tem forms the basis of these reports. The analysis in Sections 3 and 4 are conducted
at the Garda Division level. With the exception of Cork2 and Dublin3, Garda divi-
sions largely coincide with county borders.4 This allows me to analyze crime at a
2Cork is split into Cork City, Cork North, and Cork West.
3Dublin is split into six Dublin Metropolitan Regions: North, South, East, West, North Central,
and South Central.
4The remaining divisions are Cavan/Monaghan, Clare, Donegal, Galway, Kerry, Kil-
dare, Kilkenny/Carlow, Laois/Offaly, Limerick, Louth, Mayo, Meath, Roscommon/Longford,
Sligo/Leitrim, Tipperary, Waterford, Westmeath, Wexford, and Wicklow.
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disaggregated, local level. The data, which are made publicly available by the CSO,
show how many crimes were recorded each quarter by Garda´ı in every division.
I use the number of people on the Live Register to measure the health of the
labour market. The Live Register (LR) data, also provided by the CSO, include in-
formation on composition by sex and age-group (under- or over-25), and are recorded
at the social welfare office level. Live Register numbers are released monthly. Crime
statistics are released quarterly. To ensure consistency, I combined LR numbers for
three months into a quarterly average. I then aggregated the LR numbers from social
welfare offices up to the Garda division level.
It is pertinent to note that the Live Register (LR) does not measure unemploy-
ment. The LR includes all people receiving Jobseekers’ Allowance and/or Jobseekers’
Benefit. This includes, for example, low-income part-time workers. This is a desir-
able feature for the purposes of this paper: by regressing crime on LR figures, I
am capturing both underemployment as well as unemployment. This ensures that I
capture the broad effect of changes in the labour market on crime, rather than the
specific effect of strictly-defined unemployment.
Summary statistics are presented in Table 1. I focus on four types of crime. Two
are standard measures of property crime: thefts and burglaries.5
The two additional types of crime are assault and sexual offences6. The implicit
economic theory underlying the analysis is a standard Becker (1968)-type model that
crime can be represented as an alternative to traditional employment. A negative
shock to the economy transfers people from the labour market to the ‘informal al-
ternative’. Consequently we expect a strong relationship between unemployment
5Robbery is excluded because of its relative infrequency. The median number of thefts per
quarter in a division is 465. The median number of robberies is 10. Robberies are included in the
‘All property crime’ variable.
6The vast majority of sex offences in the data (93%) are listed as rape.
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Table 3.1: Summary statistics (21 local areas)
Mean Std. Dev N Min Max
Live Register (thousands) 13.99 16.09 966 2.9 110.7
Live Register (logged) 9.22 0.74 966 7.98 11.61
Theft 849.1 1837.2 966 161 10484
Burglary 295.1 524.8 966 45 3301
Assault 153.5 188.0 966 39 1150
Sexual offences 20.1 28.9 966 1 247
All property crime 1174.8 2448.8 966 248 13694
All violent crime 174.7 215.9 966 45 1368
Population 2006 (thousands) 201.9 234.9 966 79 1187
Population 2011 (thousands) 218.5 251.7 966 86 1273
Statistics are calculated for Garda Divisions. Due to geographic proximity,
districts in Cork and Dublin are aggregated to the county level.
and property crime, primarily through the mechanism of increased marginal utility
of consumption from lower income levels. We have less reason to expect a strong
relationship between unemployment and, say, assault. However there may still be
an effect of unemployment on assault if e.g. the opportunity cost of incarceration
is lower if one does not have a job. Similarly, I investigate the response of sexual
offences to unemployment, supplementing the literature finding that the number of
such offences can depend on labour market conditions.7
7This analysis assumes that the statistics reported to An Garda S´ıocha´na are an accurate mea-
sure of crimes committed. Of course if this assumption is violated, specifically if the rate of reporting
changes between areas over the period, my results will be invalid. Due to their particularly personal
nature, I suspect this is more likely to be the case for sexual offences than property crimes.
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3.3 OLS Fixed Effects Estimates
The primary method of estimation is Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) with time
and district fixed effects.8 Thus the model is an unobserved heterogeneity model:
yit = ai + δt + βxit + it
where yit is crime in district i at time t, ai is a district (e.g. county) fixed effect, δt
represents the time (quarterly × year) fixed effects, β is our coefficient of interest,
xit is the number of people on the Liver Register in district i at time t, and it is the
error term.
Unobserved heterogeneity models are estimated on changes within districts rather
than between districts. This means that any and all time-invariant characteristics
are controlled for in the analysis. Consequently concerns that e.g. Dublin might have
consistently higher crime than Kildare are quelled by this estimation procedure. The
localised nature of the data, which permits the inclusion of district fixed effects, thus
gives us a much greater degree of confidence in the estimates. The inclusion of
time fixed effects eliminates comparable concerns about time trends in crime: if the
national crime rate was unusually high in, say, the third quarter of 2004, this will
not distort the estimates.9 The regression results are reported in Table 2.
Table 3.2: Effects of the numbers on the Live Register (in thousands) on crime
8This strategy has been used in other papers in the literature, e.g. Edmark (2005).
9Although not included here, the results are also robust to the inclusion of quadratic and cubic
time trends.
111
Theft Burglary Assault Sexual All Property All Violent
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Live Register 8.916∗∗∗ 1.536∗∗∗ 1.414∗∗∗ 0.339∗∗∗ 11.66∗∗∗ 1.728∗∗∗
(0.707) (0.171) (0.0823) (0.0165) (0.922) (0.0916)
Garda Division FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year × Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 966 966 966 966 966 966
Adjusted R2 0.995 0.981 0.989 0.909 0.995 0.990
Results show the relationship between the total number of people on the Live Register in a division and various
forms of crime in that division. The data are quarterly from 2003–2014. Standard errors are clustered at the
Garda Division level. All results are weighted by Census 2006 populations.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
It is reasonable to give each unit of observation (i.e. Garda division) an identical
weight in the analysis. This would give all divisions equal importance in the estima-
tion. A more nationally representative estimate is obtained by weighting districts
by population. In our case, variations in populations can be quite large, e.g. Meath
has approximately twice the population of Westmeath. Consequently all tables are
weighted by their Census 2006 populations.10
Table 2 shows that property crime is well correlated with deteriorations in the
labour market. The interpretation of the coefficient in column 1 is that a 1,000-
person increase in the Live Register is associated with an increase of about 9 thefts
per district, per quarter. Similarly an extra thousand people on the Live Register is
expected to increase the number of violent crimes (defined as homicide, sex offences,
and assaults) in each district in each quarter by about 1.7. Overall we can see that,
holding everything else constant, property crime (defined as all thefts, burglaries,
and robberies) is several times more responsive to unemployment than violent crime.
10I have also conducted the analysis with no weights, and using Census 2011 population weights.
Magnitudes move around by changing population weights, but the qualitative interpretations remain
the same.
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Table 3.3: Estimates of the elasticity of crime with respect to Live Register figures
Theft Burglary Assault Sexual All Property All Violent
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Live Register (logged) 0.569∗∗∗ 0.491∗∗∗ 0.0582 0.627∗∗∗ 0.540∗∗∗ 0.121
(0.116) (0.114) (0.109) (0.158) (0.104) (0.107)
Garda Division FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year × Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 966 966 966 966 966 966
Adjusted R2 0.994 0.985 0.983 0.919 0.995 0.985
Results show the relationship between the logged number of people on the Live Register in a division and the
logged form of various forms of crime in that division.
These results are all highly statistically significant, but that tells us little about
the economic significance. Rather than reporting the effect in terms of absolute
numbers, it is informative to consider the results in percentage terms. In particular,
taking the log of both the number of crimes and the number of people on the Live
Register permits the interpretation of the coefficients as elasticities: how a percent
change in an independent variable leads to a percent change in the dependent vari-
able. Table 3, which reports the results from this specification, further corroborates
the evidence in Table 2. For example, the coefficient of 0.569 in first column of Table
3 implies that a 10% increase in the number of people on the Live Register in a dis-
trict is associated with a 5.69% contemporaneous increase in thefts in that district.
With an estimated elasticity of 0.491, the magnitude is very similar for burglary.
Taking the results in Table 3 collectively, we conclude again that property crime is
strongly positively correlated with the Live Register; that the effect on assaults is
not statistically distinguishable from zero; that sex offences are surprisingly sensitive
to the conditions of the labour market; and that overall the results are several times
stronger for property crime than for violent crime.
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3.4 First Difference Estimates
One further method to investigate the relationship is through first difference (FD)
estimation. The FD approach estimates the same parameter as FE estimation, but
rather than utilizing unit-specific fixed effects to capture unobserved heterogeneity,
FD estimation removes unobserved heterogeneity by differencing adjacent periods.
The FD approach is thus very similar to the within (FE) estimator approach, and
identical in the two-period case, but requires a slightly weaker condition for consis-
tency11, and thus any great divergences in estimates should raise concerns. Table 4
presents these estimates using annual changes.
Table 3.4: First differences estimates (annual)
Theft Burglary Assault Sexual All Property All Violent
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Live Register (change) 65.93∗∗∗ 45.68∗∗∗ 6.597∗∗∗ 0.642∗∗∗ 120.5∗∗∗ 7.308∗∗∗
(3.934) (2.541) (0.449) (0.104) (6.928) (0.511)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 231 231 231 231 231 231
Adjusted R2 0.308 0.414 0.424 0.373 0.326 0.416
Results show the relationship between the change in the number of people on the Live Register in a division
and the change in various forms of crime in that division.
The results in Table 4 provide further evidence that crime responds to the labour
market. These results are based on annual changes, and thus the coefficients are
expected to be approximately four times as large as the quarterly estimates in Table
2. This estimation method suggests that over the course of a year, a 1,000-person
increase in the Live Register in a district is associated with an additional 120 property
and an additional seven violent crimes. The magnitude of the results are comparable
11The strong exogeneity condition for FE is reduced to an adjacent-period exogeneity condition
for FD.
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to but larger than the earlier property crime estimates and essentially identical to
the earlier estimates of the effect on violent crimes: the analogous estimates from
Table 2 are 47 additional property crimes and seven additional violent crimes.
Taking the estimation results on the whole, I conclude that a deterioration in
labour market conditions is associated with an increase in crime. In particular, my
estimates suggest that a 10% increase in the number of people on the Live Register
leads to a 5% increase in theft, burglaries, and robberies. As one might expect, there
is also a positive relationship between a poor labour market and violent crime, but
that the relationship is considerably weaker than the relationship between labour
markets and property crime.
As mentioned earlier, the inclusion of district fixed effects removes concerns about
any time-invariant omitted variables and quarter × year fixed effects capture time
trends. However “there is nothing explicitly causal” (Levitt, 2001) about the in-
terpretation of these parameters. For example, one might suspect that there is a
problem of reverse causality: that companies relocate to avoid crime, and thus crime
partly causes unemployment. For additional evidence on the effect of unemployment
on crime I employ another, explicitly causal, identification strategy: an instrumental
variable.
3.5 Instrumental Variable Estimates
Instrumental variables are a means of identifying causal relationships by gener-
ating estimates from a plausibly exogenous mechanism. This is a hugely popular
estimation method and a large literature exists on the advantages and disadvantages
of IVs, see e.g. Angrist, Imbens and Rubin (1996) and Bound, Jaeger and Baker
(1995).
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A valid instrument requires two components. First, it must be relevant to our the
regressor. In this paper, this means that an instrument should be strongly correlated
with local labour market conditions. Second, the instrument must be exogenous. For
our purposes, this means that the instrument can only affect crime through its impact
on unemployment and not through other means.
My instrumental variable strategy uses regional variation, sectoral intensity, and
national growth rates to create an instrument similar to those made popular by
Bartik (1991). This approach has been used previously in the literature on crime
and unemployment (Gould et al., 2002).
The intuition behind the instrument is quite simple: some regions are more af-
fected by sectoral shocks than others. Consider the construction sector. In 2006,
more than 200,000 people were employed in construction. Starting in 2007, the con-
struction sector in Ireland declined rapidly. With a decline in activity of 75%, regions
with higher levels of employment in construction during the boom could be expected
to see relatively more redundancies later. This is the intuition behind the Bartik in-
strument, but there is no need to restrict ourselves to the construction sector. By ap-
plying this logic across all sectors, we can generate powerful predictors of unemploy-
ment for each region. Specifically, let sir(t) be industry i’s share of total employment
in region r at time t. Similarly let gir(t) be the employment growth rate in industry i
for region r between times t−1 and t. Now let gˆir(t) be the “almost-national” growth
rate in industry i for region r between times t−1 and t. It is almost-national because
it is the employment growth of that industry in all other regions. Formally, in an
economy with R regions and I industries, gˆir(t) = (R − 1)−1
∑R
s 6=r gis(t). We can
then define the Bartik instrument for the percent change in region r’s employment
between date t− 1 and t as zr(t) =
∑I
i=1 gˆir(t)sir(t− 1).
The instrument’s exclusion restriction is embedded into the creation of the ‘almost-
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national’ growth rate. By omitting region r’s effect in the calculation of the national
growth rate, we create a predicted growth rate that by design excludes the influence
of region r.
For this portion of the analysis, the data on the labour market come from the
CSO’s Quarterly National Household Survey (QNHS). The QNHS details the num-
bers employed in each of the fourteen NACE-2 economic sectors12 by region. There-
fore the analysis is conducted at the regional13 level. Consequently the analysis in
this section will focus on changes in employment rather than changes in the Live
Register, and by region rather than by Garda Division.
Although most Garda Divisions are easily aggregated up to regional level, e.g.
Mid-East comprises the Kildare, Meath, and Wicklow Garda Divisions, complications
arise for the Tipperary and Roscommon/Longford Garda Divisions.14 To ensure
consistency, I use crime data at the Garda Station level from the All-Island Research
Observatory. This requires aggregation up from the station level.15 Due to the highly
localised nature of the data, they are not available for particularly sensitive offences
such as sexual assault. However they are available annually for theft and burglary.
I therefore restrict attention to these crimes.
The results of first-stage regression are shown in Table 5. The specification is a
first difference estimate of changes in annual employment in each of the eight NUTS
12Agriculture, forestry and fishing; Construction; Wholesale and retail; Transportation and stor-
age; Accommodation and food service; Information and communication; Professional, scientific
and technical; Administrative and support services; Public administration and defence; Education;
Human health and social work; Industry; Financial, insurance and real estate; and Other.
13The eight NUTS 3 regions of Ireland are Border, West, Midlands, Mid-East, Dublin, South-
East, South-West, and Mid-West.
14South Tipperary is in the South-East Region, and North Tipperary is in Mid-West. Similarly,
Roscommon is in the West region, and Longford part of Midlands.
15I classify crimes recorded in Nenagh, Templemore, and Thurles as North Tipperary and there-
fore as Mid-West. Crimes recorded in the Cahir, Clonmel, and Tipperary districts are attributed
to the South-East region. Within the Longford/Roscommmon Division, Roscommon includes any
crimes from the Boyle, Castlerea, Roscommon districts; Longford comprises Longford and Granard.
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Excluded F -stat 31.49
N 72
r2 0.873
Results show the relevance of the instrumented change in number
of people employed in a region and the actual change as recorded
in the QNHS. The data are annual from 2003–2013. Standard
errors are clustered by NUTS Level 3 region. Results are weighted
by Census 2006 populations.
3 regions between 2003 and 2013. Perhaps not surprisingly, the Bartik instrument
is positively correlated with the change in employment. Further, the coefficient is
near 1. Importantly, the relationship is significant and provides an F -statistic on
the relevance of the excluded instrument equal to 31.49. The ‘rule of thumb’ for IV
relevance is that the first-stage (excluded) F ≥ 10. This is easily satisfied. Weak
instrument tests are rejected with p < 0.01.
Table 3.6: Bartik Instrument estimates for the effect of employment on crime
Theft Burglary
(1) (2)
Change in Employment (Bartik) -28.40∗∗∗ -24.64∗∗∗
(6.196) (3.700)
Year FE Yes Yes
N 72 72
r2 0.177 0.639
Results show the (second-stage) relationship between change in
employment (using Bartik instruments) and change in theft and
burglary.
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Table 6 presents the results from the second-stage of the IV regression. These
are first difference estimates of (instrumented) annual numbers employed (not un-
employed) on property crime. As discussed in Section 4, there are good reasons to
believe that the annual estimates from first differences estimation are reasonable and
satisfy the exogeneity assumptions of the procedure. The results match our prior
expectation: an increase in the numbers employed result in a significant decrease in
the number of property crimes. In particular, a 1,000-person increase in the numbers
employed in a region reduce the annual number thefts in that region by about 28.
This effect is again of the anticipated sign and of a reasonable magnitude. The effect
for burglary is very similar. Overall these results indicate that an increase in employ-
ment of 1,000 reduces by about 50 the number of property crimes in a region. These
estimates are very close to those obtained by the fixed effect estimates of Section 2,
and therefore the IV results provide clear additional evidence that improvements in
the labour market reduce crime.
3.6 Conclusion
This paper contributes to the literature on how crime responds to local labour
market conditions. I created a unique dataset capturing both crime and labour
market statistics at a disaggregated level. As Ireland is a developed country that has
experienced fascinating business cycle volatility in the past decade, the results will
be of interest both in Ireland and internationally. Exploiting the panel nature of the
data, I estimated an elasticity of property crime with respect to unemployment and
underemployment of about 0.5. The results are robust to estimation in levels, logs,
and annual first differences. As anticipated, the relationship between unemployment
and violent crime is much closer to zero.
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For robustness I confirmed the primary results using an instrumental variables
approach. Instrumenting changes in regional employment with region-specific shocks,
I again estimated a a significant relationship between property crime and the labour
market: an extra thousand people employed in a region is associated with about 50
fewer property crimes per year. The coefficients in this specification are significant,
of the same sign, and of the same order of magnitude as the OLS-based estimates.
The overall picture suggests that job creation generates the positive externality
of lower crime. Conversely, higher unemployment leads to higher crime. Consistent
with the existing literature, I find that this relationship holds for property crime
as well sexual assault. A cohesive crime reduction policy could thus include labour
market activation measures. The data used in this project end in mid-2014. Recent
trends in employment have been very favourable, and Live Register figures continue
to fall. These continued labour market improvements will provide even more varia-
tion for analysis, and future data releases will enable further tests of this relationship.
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3.7 Appendix: Data Verification
In November 2014 the CSO announced it would delay publication of its quarterly
crime statistics pending a full investigation into their reliability. This was prompted
by a Garda Inspectorate report that had found considerable under-recording of crimes
within the Pulse system. The CSO published its review of the administration of
criminal statistics in June 2015. The primary finding was that as much as 18% of
all recorded crime was not entered into the Pulse system and thus not received by
CSO.
The estimation procedures above are robust to several types of misreporting.
Principally, the statistical technique will not be biased if crime is consistently under-
or over-reported in any particular region. Similarly, the results will not be biased if
crime is misreported nationally at any particular time.
One method to test the veracity of the data is to conduct the same analysis over
different time horizons, obtaining results for e.g. 2003-2008 and 2008–2013 separately.
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2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Point estimate 95% Conf. Interval
Notes: Point estimates and confidence interval for the elasticity of theft with respect to the Live
Register. Results are based on a seven quarter moving window.
A more sophisticated method is to use a moving window and obtain point es-
timates for each time period. I employ this approach with a seven quarter moving
window, i.e. by generating results for quarter t with data from that particular quarter
and the three quarters (t−3, t−2, t−1) before and three quarters after (t+1, t+2,
t + 3). Figure 1 shows the estimated elasticity relating theft to the labour market
and the corresponding 95% confidence interval using this approach.
There are three features to note in Figure 1. Firstly, both the point estimate and
confidence interval are consistent in the first half the data, with an elasticity of 0.5
that is quite precisely estimated. Secondly, the point estimates begin a downward
trend in 2009 and are negative from 2010 onwards. Thirdly, the confidence interval
of these estimates increases approximately fourfold at about the same time. The
increase in variance is large enough that the results lose statistical significance from
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mid-2009 onwards. Figure 2 shows a comparable figure for burglary.










2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
The three findings emerge again. Firstly, there is a reasonably precisely estimated
positive elasticity in the pre-2009 era; secondly, a downward trend thereafter; and
thirdly, an enormous reduction in the precision of the estimates after the boom.
The pattern of increased variance from 2009 is particularly evident for sexual
offences. The increased variance for thefts was immediately apparent in Figure 1. In
Figure 3, I plot the results for sexual offences with the results for theft included for
scale of reference.
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2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Sex offences
Notes: Point estimates and confidence intervals for the elasticities for theft and all sexual offences.
Notice that the increase in confidence intervals is much larger for sex offences than for theft.
Although not reproduced here, the pattern of substantially larger confidence in-
tervals during the recession can be observed for other types of crime, and when an-
alyzing relationships in levels rather than logs. It is not possible to determine from
this analysis whether the decreased precision was caused by the increased economic
volatility or from a decrease in data quality. Nonetheless, the evidence suggests a
clear reduction in the precision of estimates and, if anything, a tendency for point
estimates to decrease in the post-Celtic Tiger data. Both of these effects will serve
to reduce the statistical significance of my results, tending to create attenuation bias
in Tables 1–6. As any mis-reporting in the years immediately prior to the CSO’s
investigation will tend to dampen the magnitude and significance of my estimates, I
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